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INTRODUCTION
Two centuries ago, the United States Constitution was
amended to require that "Congress ... make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."'
U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Constitution, as originally adopted, did not mention reli-
gion except for the provision in article VI, clause 3: "no religious Test shall ever be required
as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States." Id. art. VI, cl. 3.
On September 25, 1789, during the first session of the first Congress, the Bill of Rights,
comprising the first ten amendments, was proposed. The amendments were approved as
part of the Constitution on December 15, 1791, when Virginia became the eleventh state in
the Union to ratify them. For an excellent discussion of the process of drafting the First
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It was not until 1947, however, that the United States Supreme
Court, in Everson v. Board of Education,2 disseminated a strict-
separationist interpretation of the First Amendment's two religion
clauses.3 Writing for the majority, Justice Hugo Black reasoned
that New Jersey's provision of "spending tax-raised funds to pay
the bus fares of parochial school pupils" was constitutionally per-
missible because it was analogous to "such general government ser-
vices as ordinary police and fire protection, connections for sewage
disposal, public highways and sidewalks."'4 Nonetheless, the impli-
cation of the reasoning was clear: any public aid beyond the provi-
sion of such general services would fail to comport with the First
Amendment.5 Essentially, the strict-separationist position asserts
that the First Amendment's framers intended the words "Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion" to fix a
plenary divide between the political and religious spheres of Amer-
ican life." It follows from this understanding of original intent that
the Establishment Clause proscribes practically all forms of gov-
ernment aid to any school that offers religious instruction or activ-
ity as a component of its curriculum.
Two decades ago, the separationist position germinated in
Lemon v. Kurtzman,7 when the Supreme Court declared that
Pennsylvania and Rhode Island statutes which provided forms of
direct public aid to parochial schools constituted an impermissible
establishment of religion.' Under the Pennsylvania program, non-
Amendment, see THOMAS J. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA TO
THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 193-222 (1986).
2 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
' Id. at 15-18 ("The First Amendment has erected a wall between church and state...
[which] must be kept high and impregnable.").
Id. at 17-18.
See id.
See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 624-25 (1971). Although the Court has ac-
knowledged that "total separation [between church and state] is not possible in an absolute
sense," id. at 614, it has stated:
Under our system the choice has been made that government is to be entirely
excluded from the area of religious instruction and churches excluded from the
affairs of government. The Constitution decrees that religion must be a private
matter for the individual, the family, and the institutions of private choice, and
that while some involvement and entanglement are inevitable, lines must be
drawn.
Id. at 625. For a fuller discussion of the strict separationist position, see Carl H. Esbeck,
Five Views of Church-State Relations in Contemporary American Thought, 1986 B.Y.U. L.
REv. 371, 379-85.
7 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
0 Id. at 606-07.
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public elementary and secondary schools were to be reimbursed by
the state for the cost of teachers' salaries, textbooks, and instruc-
tional materials in specified secular subjects.9 The Rhode Island
plan called for the state to pay a supplement of fifteen percent of
the annual salary of teachers of secular subjects in nonpublic ele-
mentary schools.10 In striking down the statutes, the Court framed
a tripartite standard that would become the watershed through
which all subsequent Establishment Clause litigation must pass."
To withstand constitutional challenge after Lemon, a program
must have a secular purpose, a primary secular effect, and must
not result in an excessive entanglement of the government with
religion.12
Two years later, with the no-aid position firmly rooted, the
Court, in the pivotal case of Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious
Liberty v. Nyquist,'3 invalidated a New York statute that provided
modest tuition reimbursements or tax deductions based on income
levels to parents with children in nonpublic schools, and even more
modest money grants to nonpublic schools serving low-income
families for maintenance and repair of school facilities.'4 After
finding that direct aid to the parochial schools and assistance to
parents with children in such schools violated original intent,15 the
Court pursued a polliniferous pattern of strict-separationist inter-
pretation of the First Amendment in the parochial school aid
cases.' 6 Consequently, opponents of parochial school aid maintain
' Id. at 609.
'0 Id. at 607.
" Id. at 612-13; see also School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 383 (1985)
("We have particularly relied on Lemon in every case involving the sensitive relationship
between government and religion in the education of our children.").
" See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.
" 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
"1 Id. at 762-66. The New York statute provided reimbursements of $50 to $100 per
pupil to parents with incomes of less than $5,000, tax deductions of $100 to $1000 for par-
ents with incomes of $25,000 or less, and grants of $30 to $40 per student to nonpublic
schools serving low-income families. Id.
5 See LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE-RELIGION AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 175 (1986) ("[F]inancial aid to religion . . . constitutefs] an establishment of
religion.").
" See, e.g., Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985) (striking down New York City's use
of federal funds to pay salaries of public school employees who taught certain courses to
educationally deprived children from low income families in parochial schools); School Dist.
of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U,S. 373 (1985) (striking down Grand Rapids, Michigan school
district program under which public school teachers taught secular remedial and enrichment
courses in parochial schools); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (striking down Ohio
program that provided, inter alia, certain educational services, instructional materials and
[Vol. 66:261
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that the matter is now well settled. 17
To the contrary, Justice Byron R. White has persistently dis-
sented from the Supreme Court's strict-separationist, no-aid posi-
tion. 8 As the lone dissenter in Lemon, Justice White rejected the
notion that the intent of the framers of the Establishment Clause
provided a definitive answer. 9 He wrote that "neither affirmance
nor reversal of any of these cases follows automatically from the
spare language of the First Amendment, from its history, or from
the cases of this Court construing it . . . even though reasonable
men can very easily and sensibly differ over the import of that lan-
guage."20 Justice White's dissent in Nyquist was joined by Chief
Justice Warren E. Burger and Justice William H. Rehnquist.21 The
three-member dissent admonished that "the parochial school sys-
equipment as well as funds for field trips); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (striking
down Pennsylvania program that supplied educational materials such as maps, periodicals,
charts, photographs, and films to parochial schools); Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973)
(striking down Pennsylvania program that provided public funds to reimburse parents for
portion of tuition expenses incurred in sending their children to nonpublic schools); Levitt
v. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472 (1973) (striking down New
York program pursuant to which nonpublic schools were reimbursed for expenses incurred
in administering certain tests and reports).
17 See LEVY, supra note 15, at 174-75. Even prior to Lemon, Justice Douglas quoted
President Kennedy's comment at a news conference in support of the proposition that Ever-
son v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947), had settled the issue:
[T]he Constitution clearly prohibits aid to ... parochial schools....
The Everson case, which is probably the most celebrated case, provided only
by a 5 to 4 decision was it possible for a local community to provide bus rides to
nonpublic school children. But all through the majority and minority statements
on that particular question there was a very clear prohibition against aid to the
school direct.
Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 690 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting John F.
Kennedy, News Conference (Mar. 1, 1961), in 1961 PUB. PAPERS 142-43).
"S See, e.g., Lemon, 403 U.S. at 670 (White, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part)
("I cannot hold that the First Amendment forbids an agreement between the [church]
school and the State .... "). A rapid succession of cases followed Lemon: Committee for
Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 813 (1973), which provided the
opportunity for Justice White's second major dissent, and which was followed, on the same
day, by his dissent in Levitt, 413 U.S. at 482 (separate opinion not filed); Sloan, 413 U.S. at
835, where Justice White's dissent in Nyquist was applied; Meek, 421 U.S. at 387, where
Justice White joined Justice Rehnquist's opinion dissenting in part and concurring in part;
Wolman, 433 U.S. at 255, which struck down foims of aid to parochial schools, and where
for the reasons stated in Justice White's dissent in Nyquist and in Justice Rehnquist's dis-
sent in Meek, both Justices dissented from that part of the majority opinion; and finally,
Grand Rapids, 473 U.S. at 400, where Justice White, consistent with his prior dissents, filed
a brief dissent which was later applied to Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 414.
" Lemon, 403 U.S. at 662 (White, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
20 Id.
2' Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 813 (White, J., dissenting).
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tem[] has encountered financial difficulties, with many schools be-
ing closed and many more apparently headed in that direction
.... ,,22 Justice White predicted that the Court's invalidation of
parochial school aid legislation would render it "more difficult, if
not impossible, for parents to follow the dictates of their con-
science and seek a religious as well as secular education for their
children.
2
Now the sad reality verifies Justice White's then alarming
forecast.24 Increasingly, parochial schools have been forced to close
as the traditional sources of income, including contributions from
parishioners and tuition paid by parents, have proved insufficient
to support the requirements of modern education. 25 Although most
parochial schools in this country are affiliated with the Roman
Catholic Church, the loss resulting from their closing has not been
limited to students from Catholic families.26 It has particularly af-
fected a significant number of non-Catholic students and their
families in poor urban areas, where the parochial schools serve as
22 Id. at 815 (White, J., dissenting).
22 Id. at 820 (White, J., dissenting).
24 Id. at 816-18 (White, J., dissenting). In 1972, there were approximately 12,000 Catho-
lic parochial schools in the United States and approximately 4,100,000 students. See CATHO-
LIc ALMANAC 558 (Felician A. Foy, O.F.M. ed. 1985). In 1979, the numbers dropped to 9,782
schools educating 3,233,422 students. See CATHOLIC ALMANAC 526-29 (Felician A. Foy,
O.F.M. ed., 1990) [hereinafter CATHOLIC ALMANAC 1990]. These figures fell even more in
1989 where there were only 8,913 schools educating 2,632,245 students. Id. Thus, during the
sixteen-year period, from Nyquist to 1989, more than 2,000 parochial schools closed and the
student population decreased by more than 1,400,000. This represents a reduction of ap-
proximately 20% in the number of schools and approximately 30% in the size of the student
population.
" See Ari L. Goldman, Interfaith Coalition Acts To Aid Catholic Schools, N.Y. TIIES,
Jan. 30, 1991, at B7. For example, confronted with inadequate funding and school closures,
the Archbishop of New York, John Cardinal O'Connor, recently announced a one hundred
million dollar fund-raising campaign involving a coalition of Christian and Jewish business
leaders in an effort to keep parochial schools open in the poor areas of New York. Id.
26 See JAMES S. COLEMAN, EVALUATING THE WELFARE STATE: SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PER-
SPECTIVEs 273-93 (1983) [hereinafter COLEMAN, WELFARE STATE], reprinted in JAMES S.
COLEMAN, EQUALITY AND ACHIEVEMENT IN EDUCATION 250 (1990) [hereinafter COLEMAN,
EQUALITY]. The distribution of student population in parochial schools demonstrates that
several other major religious denominations sponsor schools:
[O]nly about 10% of American children attend schools other than those of the
single public school system. ...
In the private sector, by far the largest number of schools are those sponsored
by religious bodies, and of those, the largest number are Catholic, with about two-
thirds of the total private school enrollment. Baptist schools are next in size, but
with only about one-twentieth of the Catholic enrollment, and then Jewish
schools, with about half the enrollment of the Baptist schools.
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the only viable educational alternative to the public school sys-
tem. If the alarming trend of parochial school closing continues
unabated, many poor and middle-class families will simply have no
choice in education.
The Court's tradition of noble dissent has long enabled indi-
vidual Justices to serve as prophetic voices preparing the way for
advances to come.28 As Justice Charles Evans Hughes once put it,
"A dissent in a Court of last resort is an appeal to the broadening
spirit of the law, to the intelligence of a future day, when a later
decision may possibly correct the error in which the dissenting
judge believes the court to have been betrayed. ' 29 Mindful of this
27 See Goldman, supra note 25 at B7. Of the 140 Catholic, schools in poor areas of the
Archdiocese of New York, about 90% of the 51,428 students are black and Hispanic, and
only about half of them are Roman Catholic. Id. "[T]he schools range from St. Pius V in the
South Bronx, where 80 percent of the pupils are Catholic, to Transfiguration in Chinatown,
where 80 percent are Buddhists and Confucianists." Id. The situation in New York seems
typical of the service rendered to poor families nationwide, particularly in poor urban areas
of the country. In 1972, Justice White noted that "[s]ixty-two percent of nonpublic school
students [were] concentrated in eight industrialized, urbanized States: New York, Pennsyl-
vania, Illinois, California, Ohio, New Jersey, Michigan, and Massachusetts." Nyquist, 413
U.S. at 816-17 (White, J., dissenting). Statistics indicate that of the total of 2,632,245 Catho-
lic school students in 1989, 1,585,911 were concentrated in the same "eight industrialized,
urban States." CATHOLIC ALMANAC 1990, supra note 24, at 526-29.
28 See William J. Brennan, Jr., In Defense of Dissents, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 427, 431
(1986) (dissents reveal "the perceived congruence between the Constitution and the 'evolv-
ing standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society' ") (quoting Trop v.
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (plurality opinion)); see also John J. Hoeffner, One Hundred
Years of Solitude: Dissent in the Second Circuit, 1891-1991, 65 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 875
(1991).
The benefits of dissent are of two types: the first type reflects broad, system-wide
concerns; the second, concerns limited to the particular issues on which the dis-
sent is based. The broad, system-wide benefits are unlikely to act as a conscious
influence upon the decision to dissent in most cases, but in assessing the value of
dissent, such benefits are of more than incidental importance.
Id. at 882-83. The early decisions of the Supreme Court were issued with each Justice offer-
ing individual opinions seriatim. Laura K. Ray, Justice Brennan and the Jurisprudence of
Dissent, 61 TEMP. L. REV. 307, 308 (1988). In 1801, under the leadership of Chief Justice
John Marshall, the Court began to issue a single opinion-very often one prepared by the
Chief Justice. Id. Thomas Jefferson, with an anticlerical allusion, complained that this new
procedure found the justices "'huddled up in conclave'." Id. at 308 n.12 (quoting Letter
from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Ritchie, December 25, 1820, in THE WORKS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 175 (1905)). Despite Jefferson's criticism, the role of dissents became well-estab-
lished by the turn of the century. Consider the two well-known examples of Lochner v. New
York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("This case is decided upon an eco-
nomic theory which a large part of the country does not entertain.") and Plessy v. Ferguson,
163 U.S. 537, 554-55 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("In my opinion, the judgment this day
rendered will, in time, prove to be quite ... pernicious ....").
" CHARLES EVANS HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 68 (1928). In
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important role, this Article adopts Justice White's dissents as a
starting point, and on this basis attempts to articulate a revised
approach to the parochial school aid issue. The compelling public
policy reasons in support of parochial school aid are considered in
Part I. Next, a critical examination of the historical foundation
and concrete applications of the Lemon standard is conducted in
Part II. It is proffered that the exigencies of public policy ought no
longer be denied on the ground of a legal doctrine whose founda-
tion is erroneous and whose application is in disarray. Finally, in
Part III, the voucher concept is endorsed as a form of parochial
school aid that would not offend stare decisis, and, at the same
time, would afford the opportunity to prevent a tragic loss of the
parochial schools.
Whether Justice White's voice will be ultimately recognized as
prophetic, of course, remains to be seen. Nonetheless, there are
portentous indications of a vernal season with regard to First
Amendment jurisprudence, and its inception may well infuse new
life into Justice White's position.3 0 To be sure, it would signify
addition to the purpose of paving the way for possible corrections of erroneous majority
opinions, dissents can serve to clarify the majority position, prompt legislative changes, and
sharpen debate on controversial and important matters of social policy. See generally Stan-
ley H. Fuld, The Voices of Dissent, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 923, 927 (1962) ("A dissent... is, in
a very real sense .... an antidote for judicial lethargy ....").
10 Several Justices currently serving on the Court have expressed general dissatisfaction
with the Court's First Amendment jurisprudence. In Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975),
Justice Rehnquist noted in dissent:
I am disturbed as much by the overtones of the Court's opinion as by its
actual holding. The Court apparently believes that the Establishment Clause of
the First Amendment not only mandates religious neutrality on the part of gov-
ernment but also requires that this Court go further and throw its weight on the
side of those who believe that our society as a whole should be a purely secular
one. Nothing in the First Amendment or in the cases interpreting it requires such
an extreme approach ....
Id. at 395 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Justice O'Connor, dissent-
ing in Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985), labeled as "tragic" the majority's decision to
strike down a New York City program under which federal funds were used to pay the
salaries of public school teachers who entered parochial schools to offer remedial instruction
to educationally deprived children from low-income families. Id. at 431 (O'Connor, J., dis-
senting). She flatly "reject[ed] [the majority's] theory and the analysis in Meek v. Pittenger
on which it is based." Id.
More recently, in County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989), a case that raised
Establishment Clause concerns over the display of a Christmas creche, Justice Kennedy was
joined in dissent by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and Scalia. See id. at 655
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Rejecting the majority holding that the
display was unconstitutional, the four-member dissent stated that "[t]his view of the Estab-
lishment Clause reflects an unjustified hostility toward religion, a hostility inconsistent with
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hope of new life for equal educational opportunity, for family
choice in education, and for the free exercise of religion.
I. PUBLIC POLICY: TOWARDS A CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY
CONSONANT WITH SOCIAL REALITY AND THE FUNDAMENTAL DIGNITY
OF THE INDIVIDUAL
Consistent with Justice White's admonition that the "most
profound reasons" of public policy sustain the need for parochial
school aid, the denial of such aid forebodes dire societal conse-
quences. 1 One such consequence lies in the fact that for many low-
income families in urban areas, parochial schools offer the only
promise of equal educational opportunity. Another concerns the
constitutional right of parents as the primary educators of their
children. A third is raised by a consideration of the free exercise
right. In the absence of parochial schools, these constitutional
guarantees amount to "a language of rights as abstract opportuni-
ties to enjoy certain advantages rather than a language of the con-
crete and actual experience of social life" for many children from
low- and middle-income families.
32
Constitutional theory demands praxis. The parochial schools
are for many the concrete experience of the three constitutional
rights. I will suggest that the parochial schools are able to secure
these guarantees for the poor and powerless, precisely because of
the role they fulfill as local, nongovernmental institutions. In the
original constitutional scheme, such subsidiary structures were as-
sumed to be inherent to the fabric of a just society. Thus, a legisla-
tive effort for the provision of aid may be justified by compelling
public policy considerations grounded in constitutional theory and
praxis.
A. Constitutional Theory and Local, Nongovernmental Educa-
tional Institutions
1. The Transformation of American Education
Although the image of the public school administered by a
professional class of educators under the auspices of the state may
our history and our precedents .... ." Id.
3, See Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 819 (White, J., dissenting).
32 ROBERTO M. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 74 (1974).
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have become sacrosanct during this century, the current system of
American education is now in question.33 What is considered a sac-
rilege in the contemporary popular imagination may be nothing
less than an attempt to retrieve forfeited insight of the Constitu-
tion's framers. At the time of the adoption of the Constitution and
the Bill of Rights, an array of nongovernmental structures served
as crucial mediators in societal life. James Madison envisioned a
kind of social order composed of a "multiplicity of interests and
sects" to enable a vigorous social pluralism. 34 Culture was to be
shaped and formed by local, nongovernmental structures and not
by an "omnicompetent society-state. '35 Among other societal enti-
ties, the extended family, churches, and schools constituted the
fabric and actual experience of American life.
Until the end of the nineteenth century, American education
was consistent with the constitutional assumption of a vigorous so-
cial pluralism. No one "system" of American public education ex-
isted. The decentralization of authority for education permitted
"the multiplicity of interests and sects" to have a voice in what
children learned.3 6 Schools were responsive to families, neighbor-
hoods, and communities and, as such, made a significant contribu-
tion to community life.37 Diversity, autonomy, and personalism,
rather than governmental control, bureaucracy, and secularism,
were the hallmarks of American education.
Perhaps, the current crisis in American education can be
33 See JOHN E. CHUBB & TERRY M. MOE, POLITICS, MARKETS & AMERICA'S SCHOOLS
(1990); PAUL E. PETERSON, THE POLITICS OF SCHOOL REFORM, 1870-1940 (1985); DAVID B.
TYACK, THE ONE BEST SYSTEM: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN URBAN EDUCATION (1974).
31 THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 324 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). De-
fending the separation of powers in the proposed federal government, Madison explained:
Whilst all authority in it [the United States] will be derived from and dependent
on the society, the society itself will be broken into so many parts, interests and
classes of citizens, that the rights of individuals, or of the minority, will be in little
danger from interested combinations of the majority. In a free government the
security for civil rights must be the same as that for religious rights. It consists in
the one case in the multiplicity of interests, and in the other in the multiplicity of
sects. The degree of security in both cases will depend on the number of interests
and sects ....
Id. at 351-52.
31 See JOHN C. MURRAY, S.J., WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS: CATHOLIC REFLECTIONS ON THE
AMERICAN PROPOSITION 35 (1960). The First Amendment favors a "government of limited
powers, whose limitations are determined by the consent of the people." Id. at 47.
3' See CHUBB & MOE, supra note 33, at 3-6; TYACK, supra note 33, at 18-27.
3 TYACK, supra note 33, at 13-39 (presenting persuasive evidence that rural schools and
local schools in urban neighborhoods were significant contributors to sense of community
life up until end of nineteenth century).
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traced to the first half of the twentieth century, when a nationwide
institutional reform of the public schools dramatically changed
American education."' The change was rooted in the Progressive
era and highlighted the "building [of] a rational system of schools
for the nation as a whole, triumphing over the parochialism, frag-
mentation, and party machines of an unenlightened past."39 A pri-
mary tenet of the reform held that the optimal educational setting
was neutral and secular, free from the prejudices associated with
religion.40 To this end, education was to be placed in the hands of
impartial professional administrators and teachers who would cre-
ate "the one best system."'41 This professional class even fabricated
a "conventional historiography" that conveniently neglected the
persuasive and profound religious influence in American public ed-
ucation up to the time of the reform.42
Now viewed with the chastened perspective of hindsight, the
reform has been roundly criticized by those who do not agree that
it resulted in the "one best system.' ' 43 Unfortunately, the real win-
ners of the reform were not "the less powerful segments of the
American population: the lower classes, ethnic and religious minor-
3" See LAWRENCE A. CREMIN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE SCHOOL: PROGRESSIVISM IN
AMERICAN EDUCATION, 1876-1957 (1961); JOSEPH M. CRONIN, THE CONTROL OF URBAN
SCHOOLS: PERSPECTIVE ON THE POWER OF EDUCATIONAL REFORMERS (1973); PETERSON, supra
note 33.
" CHUBB & MOE, supra note 33, at 4.
40 See JOHN DEWEY, A COMMON FAITH 1-28 (1934). John Dewey, one of the reform
movement's leading theorists, steadfastly propagated the tenet. Distinguishing between "re-
ligion" and "the religious," Dewey argued that their "opposition .. . [was] not to be
bridged" since the latter was opposed to the aims of liberal education while the former was
essentially a general and secular human experience. See id. at 3, 28. In Dewey's thought,
"religion .. .always signifies a special body of beliefs and practices having some kind of
institutional organization .... Id. at 9. Instead, "[t]he religious attitude signifies something
that is bound through imagination to a general attitude. This comprehensive attitude ... is
much broader than anything indicated by 'moral' in its usual sense. The quality of attitude
is displayed in art, science and good citizenship." Id. at 23. Dewey concluded that "because
the release of these values is so important, their identification with the creeds and cults of
religions must be dissolved." Id. at 28.
4, TYACK, supra note 33, at 39-59.
4' David B. Tyack, The Kingdom of God and the Common School, Protestant Minis-
ters and the Awakening of the West, 36 HARV. EDUC. REV. 446, 448 (1966).
11 TYACK, supra note 33, at 269-91. Most recently, the critique was persuasively argued
by John Chubb and Terry Moe. See CHUBB & MOE, supra note 33, passim. For a general
discussion regarding educational reform in the United States, see SAMUEL BOWLES & HER-
BERT GINTIS, SCHOOLING IN CAPITALIST AMERICA: EDUCATIONAL REFORM AND THE CONTRADIC-
TIONS OF ECONOMIC LIFE (1976); MICHAEL B. KATZ, CLASS, BUREAUCRACY AND SCHOOLS: THE
ILLUSION OF EDUCATIONAL CHANGE IN AMERICA (1971); and PETERSON, supra note 33.
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ities, and citizens of rural communities." '44 These groups were dis-
enfranchised by the reforms and "control over local schools was...
largely transferred to the new system's political and administrative
authorities-who, according to what soon became official doctrine,
knew best what kind of education people needed and how it could
be provided most effectively." 5
The ideal of public education ought not to be confused with
the institutional reforms that were dedicated to building a uniform
system of schools for the nation to replace the diversity and auton-
omy in public education that preceded the reform movement.
When the Constitution was framed, the order of education was au-
tonomous from the government, and this distinction, was viewed as
crucial to the functioning of a healthy democratic republic. 46 If the
government was to be one of limited powers, it would be necessary
for the order of ideas propagated in society to be distinct from the
government itself. An educated citizenry was considered a prereq-
uisite to insure that government and its policies would not be the
sole or determinative factor of what the people would think and
value, and the sine qua non of the independent, intelligent, and
respectful exchange of ideas in society. It was essential that the
government's power to curtail and inhibit the propagation and ex-
change of ideas be limited lest the government become synony-
4, CHUBB & MOE, supra note 33, at 4.
45 Id.
46 See id. at 3-6; TYACK, supra note 33, at 13-39. In fact, the relationship between the
state and education was characterized by both approbation and appropriation of state pub-
lic funds for certain schools that were founded by and remained under the authority of
churches. See JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., THE BELIEVER AND THE POWERs THAT ARE: CASES, His-
TORY AND OTHER DATA BEARING ON THE RELATION OF RELIGION AND GOVERNMENT 137-40
(1987). Judge Noonan has culled the following illustrative examples of this relationship from
the nation's first decades: (1) the declaration of the Continental Congress in 1787 encourag-
ing religious schools as "being necessary to good government and the happiness of man-
kind," id. at 137 (citing An Ordinance for the Government of the Territory of the United
States North-West of the River Ohio, ch. 8, art. III, 1 Stat. 50, 51-53 (1789)); (2) the adjust-
ment by Congress of the Northwest Ordinance to conform to the First Amendment, id. at
138 (citing Act of August 7, 1789, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50 (1789)); (3) the award by Congress of a
land grant to the Baptist-founded Columbian College (later George Washington University)
in 1832, id. (citing Act of July 14, 1832, ch. 248, 4 Stat. 603 (1832)); (4) a similar land grant
to the Roman Catholic Georgetown College in 1833, id. (citing Act of March 2, 1833, ch. 86,
6 Stat. 538 (1833)); and (5) the refusal at the Massachusetts Constitutional Convention of
1820 to alter the Unitarian control of the Harvard University Board of Overseers on the
ground that the institution, which received substantial public funding, was beyond control




mous with and subsume culture.47 The loss of local, nongovern-
mental stewardship over the schools, however, is inconsistent with
the vigorous social pluralism envisioned by the architects of the
Constitution. That the constitutional vision for education contin-
ues to be necessary for a just society is demonstrated by a consid-
eration of the common good in relation to the parochial schools.
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2. Parochial Schools and the Common Good
Public education is a direct manifestation of the state's invo-
cation of the common good. Thomas Jefferson recommended that
"[n]o other sure foundation.., be devised for the preservation of
freedom and happiness" than "the diffusion of knowledge among
the people. '49 On more than one occasion, the Supreme Court has
"acknowledged that public schools are vitally important 'in the
preparation of individuals for participation as citizens' and as vehi-
47 See MURRAY, supra note 35, at 35. "Government submits itself to judgment by the
truth of society; it is not itself a judge of the truth in society." Id. The "order of politics" is
distinct from the "order of culture." Id. This is perhaps nowhere more obvious than in the
constitutionally guaranteed right of free speech. The right does not rest on the tenuous
theory that one ought to be free to say whatever one thinks merely because -one thinks it. To
the contrary, the right is at least in part a recognition that before citizens can be called
upon to submit to governmental policies that require them to bear burdens and to sacrifice
individual liberties, they have the right to discuss and pass judgment on such policies. See
id. at 34-35. This is particularly the case in a pluralistic society where viewpoints and opin-
ions are certain to conflict, and where minority positions may easily be overlooked.
'8 See generally Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70 n.9 (1989) (stat-
ing that "'body politic or corporate' as '[a] social compact by which the whole people cove-
nants with each citizen, and each citizen with the whole people, that all should be governed
by certain laws for the common good' "). For an explication of the common good from a
leading legal theorist, see JOHN FINNIs, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 134-93 (1980).
The principle of common good is not limited to natural law. It is equally consistent, for
example, with the functional approach adopted by the law and economics movement. See
Michael W. McConnell & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Issues of Religious
Freedom, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 20 (1989). Thus, services such as bus transportation to
school-at issue in Everson-appropriately may be state-funded since they provide an in-
herently "secular function" and "neither add[] to nor subtract[] from the religiosity of the
educational experience." Id.
"9 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Wythe (Aug. 13, 1786), reprinted in THE
PORTABLE THOMAS JEFFERSON 399 (1975). As the Virginia Assembly met to revise its Code of
Laws, Jefferson urged Wythe to
[p]reach... a crusade against ignorance; establish and improve the law for edu-
cating the common people. Let our countrymen know that the people alone can
protect us ... and that the tax which will be paid for this purpose is not more
than the thousandth part of what will be paid to kings, priests and nobles who will
rise up among us if we leave the people in ignorance.
Id. at 399-400.
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cles for 'inculcating fundamental values necessary to the mainte-
nance of a democratic political system.'-"o When considering the
issue of parochial school aid, it seems fair to inquire whether the
parochial schools share this noble mission.
Justice White has observed that the parochial schools fulfill a
dual function in American society, furthering both secular and reli-
gious ends." The secular education that parochial schools afford to
hundreds of thousands of American children each year is, of
course, an uncompensated donation to the common good. If the
parochial schools had failed to offer quality instruction in secular
subjects, it seems unlikely that they would have survived in the
face of fully tax-supported public schools.2 Given the complexities
and requirements of modern secular education, particularly in re-
sponse to the burden created by the increased regulatory role of
the state, it is remarkable that the parochial schools have en-
dured.53 Their vitality stems in large part from the benevolence of
the parents of parochial school children who pay public school
taxes and at the same time relieve the state from the financial bur-
den of educating their children. Fundamental justice beckons that
they ought to receive some form of compensation from the state.5 4
"o Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 864 (1982) (quoting Ambach v. Norwick, 441
U.S. 68, 76-77 (1979)).
51 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 663 (1971) (White, J., concurring in part, dissent-
ing in part).
5' A recurring theme in Justice White's rationale is that parochial schools are able to
provide secular education of a quality comparable to that provided by the public schools.
See Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 818 (1973)
(White, J., dissenting); see also Lemon, 403 U.S. at 666-67 (White, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part) (teachers testified that education was comparable). For statistical evi-
dence demonstrating that parochial schools provide superior secular education to students
from low-income families, see infra notes 66-71.
53 See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 655, 657-58 (1989) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part).
In this century, as the modern administrative state expands to touch the lives of
its citizens in such diverse ways and redirects their financial choices through pro-
grams of its own, it is difficult to maintain the fiction that requiring government
to avoid all assistance to religion can in fairness be viewed as serving the goal of
neutrality.
Id. at 657-58.
Several authors have suggested that neutrality is impossible with the advent of the
modern regulatory state. See Donald A. Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment,
and Doctrinal Development: The Nonestablishment Principle (pt. 2), 81 HARV. L. REV. 513,
522-26 (1968); cf. McConnell & Posner, supra note 48, at 7-8 (present day pervasive state
regulations prevent reference to colonial period when determining whether state advances or
inhibits religion).
11 See Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 814 (White, J., dissenting).
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Dissenting in Nyquist, Justice White suggested that "constitu-
tional considerations aside, it would be understandable" to give
parents of parochial school children "a call on the public treasury
up to the amount it would have cost the State to educate the child
in public school, or . ..up to the amount the parents save the
State by not sending their children to public school." 55 Therefore,
the absence of remuneration amounts to a penalty levied against
those parents who elect to send children to nonpublic schools. 6
While the secular purpose of the parochial schools advances
the common good, their religious purpose does not detract from it.
No one ought to be disinclined to acknowledge that religious in-
struction and opportunities for worship are a constitutive part of
the parochial school education.57 Religious formation is valued by
churches because it is believed to lay the foundation for a mature
faith. It also contributes to individual development of students by
reinforcing self-control, inculcating moral standards, and encourag-
The parents of such [parochial school] children pay taxes, including school taxes.
They could receive in return a free education in the public schools. They prefer to
send their children, as they have the right to do, to nonpublic schools that furnish
the satisfactory equivalent of a public school education but also offer subjects or
other assumed advantages not available in public schools.
Id.
55 Id.; see also Jesse H. Choper, The Establishment Clause and Aid to Parochial
Schools-An Update, 75 CAL. L. REV. 5, 13-14 (1987) (suggesting that aid to parochial schools
should be upheld where secular purpose exists and where amount of government expendi-
ture does not exceed value of secular services provided).
16 Saint Thomas Aquinas divided justice into two types, commutative and distributive.
Commutative justice concerns the allocation of resources in transactions between individu-
als, whereas distributive justice concerns the allocation of resources in society. See THOMAS
AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIcA, II-Il, q. 61, art.1 (London 1920); see also FINNIS, supra note
48, at 177-79. Consistent with the Thomistic distinction, John Finnis notes that "[a] disposi-
tion is distributively just ... if it is a reasonable resolution of a problem of allocating some
subject matter that is essentially common but that needs (for the sake of the common good)
to be appropriated to individuals." Id. at 166-67; see also MURRAY, supra note 35, at 148
(system that does not allocate resources to satisfy educational needs of segment of commu-
nity is not distributively just).
'7 McConnell & Posner, supra note 48, at 4-5. The value of religious formation was
recently extolled from an economic perspective:
Religious institutions provide many things: instruction about universal and tran-
scendental truths; opportunities for ritual and worship; guidance about how to
lead an ethical and satisfying life; care for the poor, the sick, the orphaned, and
the alien; facilities for promoting fellowship and a sense of community. Church
schools offer ethical and religious training and an atmosphere designed to keep
the children of church members within the faith, as well as secular training
designed to prepare children for civilized and productive life.
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ing acts of charity and self-sacrifice.5 8 Certainly nothing in such
formation is antithetical to the Constitution or to the common
good.59 At the same time, however, few would dispute that a salu-
brious separation of church and state warrants responsibility for
religious formation to reside solely with the various sects and
faiths in a pluralistic society. It would be beyond acceptable pa-
rameters for the government to aid religious formation by building
chapels, purchasing catechisms, or paying the salaries of religious
teachers. No program of parochial school aid to be considered by
the Court has ever included such kinds of direct aid to religious
formation. The truths that the parochial schools serve a religious
purpose and that the government ought not propagate religion
have never been in dispute.
Not only is the common good not depreciated, but certain sec-
ular benefits also accrue to it from the parochial schools' religious
purpose. The first benefit stems from the nature of religious forma-
tion of children. If formation to live life in recognition of a divine
being and transcendental values benefits churches and individual
members, it also serves to enhance the general quality of life in
society. A paradox of life in the modern liberal state is that while
freedom is often defined as the absence of government constraint
on the individual, the quality and even continuance of life in the
state depends on acts of individual self-sacrifice, often enough of
heroic proportions. Religious training arguably increases the
probability that individuals within a society will be disposed to
serve societal interest by sometimes setting self-interest aside in
both ordinary and heroic ways.
Apart from nurturing a certain individual formation, parochial
schools, by realizing their religious purpose, enhance the common
good in an even more fundamental way. Consistent with the
"8 See FINNIS, supra note 48, at 168. Pointing to a nexus between the common good and
individual development, John Finnis argues that "the common good is fundamentally the
good of individuals .... [T]he fundamental task ... is self-constitution or self-possession;
inner integrity of character and outer authenticity of action are aspects of the basic good ...
as are freedom from the automatism of habit and from subjection to unintegrated impulses
and compulsions .... Id.
"' See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925) (holding that state may not
require students to attend public schools if nonpublic schools satisfy secular education re-
quirements). However, the Supreme Court has observed that "'[t]o maintain an organized
society that guarantees religious freedom to a great variety of faiths requires that some
religious practices yield to the common good.'" Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 702 (1986)
(quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 259 (1982)).
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Madisonian ideal of a vigorous social pluralism, the common good
prospers in a social fabric characterized by numerous and diverse
local, nongovernmental institutions. Such subsidiary structures
tend to foster a greater degree of initiative, responsibility, and
ownership for the common task than that fostered by state-con-
trolled ventures.6 0 Because a material dividend often inures, the
principle of subsidiarity posits that what can be competently ac-
complished by smaller associations, groups, and communities must
not be appropriated by the state. 1 As the revised history of the
American public school has revealed, the assumptions of the fram-
ers about education were consistent with this principle. Despite
the fabrication of a thoroughly secular system of education in this
century, it is perhaps not without irony that the parochial schools
reflect fealty to the framers' assumptions precisely because they
have retained their religious identity.6 2
60 See FINNIS, supra note 48, at 155. The common good may be described as "a set of
conditions which enables the members of a community to attain for themselves reasonable
objectives, or to realize reasonably for themselves the value(s), for the sake of which they
have reason to collaborate with each other ... in a community." Id. The notion involves a
recognition that "[f]ew will flourish, and no one will flourish securely, unless there is an
effective collaboration of persons, and co-ordination of resources and of enterprises." Id. at
165; see also AQUINAS, supra note 56, I-I, q. 90, art. 2 & 3.
" Pope Pius XI, Quadragesimo Anno (1931), in WILLIAM J. GIBBONS, S.J., SEVEN GREAT
ENCYCLICALS 125, 147 (1963). A classic description of the principle of subsidiarity has been
formulated as follows:
[I]t is a fundamental principle of social philosophy, fixed and unchangeable, that
bne should not withdraw from individuals and commit to the community what
they can accomplish by their own enterprise and industry.... [I]t is an injustice
and at the same time a grave evil and a disturbance of right order, to transfer to
the larger and higher collectively functions which can be performed and provided
for by lesser and subordinate bodies. Inasmuch as every social activity should, by
its very nature, prove a help to members of the body social, it should never de-
stroy or absorb them.
Id.
62 See generally Thomas Hoffer et al., Achievement Growth in Public and Catholic
Schools, 58 Soc. oF EDuc. 74 (Apr. 1985), reprinted in COLEMAN, EQUALITY, supra note 26,
at 302 (noting educational primacy of Catholic schools). Summarizing extensive comparative
studies of public school and Catholic school performance, a group of prominent social scien-
tists has noted:
American educators and educational researchers typically assume that Catholic
schools are academically inferior to public schools. They attribute this inferiority
to larger classes, less-professional teacher training, more limited resources, smaller
per-pupil costs, and religious narrowness, which they believe restricts thought and
imagination. To show that Catholic schools, for all their apparent weaknesses, are
not worse than public schools may not be too unsettling. But to suggest, as we
have, that in terms of academic outcome they might be somewhat better is such a
reversal of conventional wisdom that one might well expect intense debate. How
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Even if state control of a particular task might yield a higher
material dividend, the decision regarding allocation of the task
must still include a recognition of the less tangible factors of the
assurance of individual rights and the continuance of community
activity.6 3 The religious nature of the parochial school engenders a
sense of community among students and their families. Serving as
a corrective to the dehumanizing aspects of life in the modern sec-
ular state, the parochial school communicates the fundamental
dignity of the individual. It is this fundamental dignity upon which
all constitutional praxis, including the rights of equal educational
opportunity, parents as primary educators, and free exercise of re-
ligion, ultimately depend. A revised theory of First Amendment ju-
risprudence ought to permit the Court to consider the contribution
of parochial school education to the common good in reaching its
pronouncements on the constitutional validity of public aid.
B. Constitutional Praxis and Parochial Schools
1. The Facts Concerning Equal Educational Opportunity: The
Untold Story of Catholic Schools
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
guarantees that no child will be deprived of an equal educational
opportunity by reason of race, religion, or national origin. 4 In
could schools that have always been thought to be somewhat less effective be more
effective, and how could schools thought to undermine the American ideal of the
common school somehow be closer to that ideal than the public schools?
Id.
I 3 See FINNIs, supra note 48, at 169. John Finnis has argued that justice to the individ-
ual and community requires subsidiarity even where it may be less financially advantageous
than a state effort:
[C]ommon enterprises should be regarded, and practically conducted, not as ends
in themselves but as means of assistance, as ways of helping individuals to "help
themselves" or, more precisely, to constitute themselves. And in all those fields of
activity . . . where individuals, or families, or other relatively small groups, can
help themselves by their own private efforts and initiatives without thereby injur-
ing (either by act or omission) the common good, they are entitled in justice to be
allowed to do so, and it is unjust to require them to sacrifice their private initia-
tive by demanding that they participate instead in a public enterprise; it remains
unjust even if the material dividend they receive from the public enterprise is as
great as or even somewhat greater than the material product of their own private
efforts would have been.
Id.
"' U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. This right has been held to be essential to the preservation
of the democratic and egalitarian foundations of the American constitutional system. See
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1964, section 402 of the Civil Rights Act mandated the conduct of
social policy research "concerning the lack of availability of equal
educational opportunities."65 The mandate marked the inception
of several decades of extensive and comprehensive studies con-
ducted by a team of social scientists under the direction of Univer-
sity of Chicago Professor James S. Coleman. In 1966, social scien-
tists reached two conclusions: First, that children belonging to
racial minorities from low-income families "have a serious educa-
tional deficiency at the start of school, which is obviously not a
result of school"; and second, "they have an even more serious de-
ficiency at the end of school, which is obviously in part a result of
school."
'66
During the course of the ensuing twenty-five years, follow-up
studies and reports have indicated that despite massive efforts to
reform public education in this country, the achievement of chil-
dren from poor minority families has not greatly improved.6 7 Con-
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954); see also Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S.
853, 864 (1982) (quoting Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76-77 (1979)) ("[P]ublic schools
are vitally important 'in the preparation of individuals for participation as citizens,' and as
vehicles for 'inculcating fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic
political system.' ").
Beneath the constitutional guarantee of equal educational opportunity lies a deeper
question concerning the meaning of "equality" in education. Cf. San Antonio Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1973) (upholding greater level of funding for wealthy school
districts). John Rawls has suggested that equality necessitates removing the "accidents of
natural endowment and the contingencies of social circumstance." JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY
OF JUSTICE 15 (1971). Robert Nozick has responded to Rawls by arguing that the human
condition itself gives rise to innate and acquired skills. He contends that the individual
alone has the right to decide how to use these skills in the free community. ROBERT NozICK,
ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 235-38 (1974). John Coleman criticizes both positions as "ex-
treme": the implication of Rawls' theory being that children ought to be taken from their
parents and raised as wards of the state, while for Nozick all education ought to be private
and paid for by each family according to its resources and preferences. See Rawls, Nozick
and Educational Equality, PUB. INTEREST, Spring 1976, at 121, reprinted in COLEMAN,
EQUALITY, supra note 26, at 55.
" Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. IV, § 402, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 247.
The Commissioner shall conduct a survey and make a report to the President and
the Congress, within two years of the enactment of this title, concerning the lack
of availability of equal educational opportunities for individuals by reason of race,
color, religion, or national origin in public educational institutions at all levels in
the United States, its territories and possessions, and the District of Columbia.
Id. (repealed by Pub. L. No. 95-561, tit. I, § 101(c) 92 Stat. 2200 (Nov. 1, 1978)).
" Equal Schools or Equal Students?, PUB. INTEREST, Summer 1966, at 70-75, reprinted
in COLEMAN, EQUALITY, supra note 26, at 123.
17 See generally CHUBB & MOE, supra note 33, at 110 (providing most recent compre-
hensive summary of test results concerning failure of American public education). In addi-
tion, Coleman and his colleagues have conducted several follow-up studies that confirm
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sequently, one is obliged to conclude that considerable government
effort and expense to provide equal educational opportunity in the
public schools over the past twenty-five years have been largely
ineffective.
The efforts of Coleman and his colleagues included longitudi-
nal studies that compared the racially heterogeneous student
populations of the urban Catholic schools with those of urban pub-
lic schools.6 8 The government-sponsored research showed that the
parochial schools constitute an attractive alternative to the educa-
tional plight of the urban poor.6 9 Specifically, racial minorities
from low-income families in Catholic high schools consistently
achieved significantly higher levels in verbal and mathematics
skills than did similarly situated children in public schools. 70 Fur-
their initial results. See ON EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 146-67 (Frederick Mos-
teller & Daniel P. Moynihan eds., 1972), reprinted in COLEMAN, EQUALITY, supra note 26, at
134-65; see also NATIONAL COMMISSION ON EXCELLENCE IN EDUCATION, A NATION AT RISK:
THE IMPERATIVE FOR EDUCATIONAL REFORM 5 (1983) ("[T]he educational foundations of our
society are presently being eroded by a rising tide of mediocrity."); cf. ERNEST L. BOYER,
HIGH SCHOOL: A REPORT ON SECONDARY EDUCATION IN AMERICA passim (1983) (identifying
12 priorities necessary for improvement of schools).
'8 See COLEMAN, WELFARE STATE, supra note 26, at 273, reprinted in COLEMAN, EQUAL-
ITY, supra note 26, at 250-68.
" See Hoffer et al., supra note 62, at 272-73. By 1981, it had become apparent that
[almong Catholic schools, achievement of students from less advantaged back-
grounds-blacks, Hispanics, and those whose parents are poorly educated-is
closer to that of students from advantaged backgrounds than is true for the public
sector. Family background makes much less difference for achievement in Catholic
schools than in public schools. This greater homogeneity of achievement in the
Catholic sector (as well as lesser racial and ethnic segregation of the Catholic sec-
tor) suggests that the ideal of the common school is more nearly met in the Cath-
olic schools than in the public schools. This may be because a religious commu-
nity continues to constitute a functional community to a greater extent than
does a residential area, and in such a functional community there will be less
stratification by family background, both within a school and between schools.
Quality and Equality in American Education: Public and Catholic Schools, 63 PHI DELTA
KAPPAN 159 (1981), reprinted in COLEMAN, EQUALITY, supra note 26, at 247 (emphasis
added).
For statistical evidence supporting the claim that Catholic schools generally reflect less
segregated student populations than do public and other private schools, see COLEMAN,
WELFARE STATE, supra note 26, at 256.
70 See Hoffer et al., supra note 62, at 272-73. Longitudinal tests designed to measure
the change in school effects between the sophomore and senior years of high school revealed
that
[t]he combined test score of the public-school students increased from 37.22 to
44.22, while the test score of the Catholic-school students increased from 47.51 to
56.78. Thus, between the sophomore and senior years, the Catholic-school advan-
tage in vocabulary, reading, math, and writing increased from 10.29 correct an-
swers to 12.56-an increase of 2.27 items. Note that this is not a repetition of the
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thermore, it was discovered that the attrition rate for children who
attended Catholic high schools was considerably lower than for
those in public schools. 1
On the basis of extensive research, Coleman concluded that
the difference must be attributed in large part to "the community
surrounding the Catholic school, a community created by the
church. '7 2 In his words, "this church-and-school community, with
its social networks and its norms about what teenagers should and
should not do, constituted social capital beyond the family that
aided both family and school in the education of the family's chil-
dren. '7 3 The "social capital" provided by the parochial schools
seemed to compensate for the breakdown of the traditional family
structure.
A child from a single-parent, low-income family in parochial
school was much more likely to remain in school than was a child
from a single-parent family in public school. 4 Moreover, religious
observance alone could not account for these effects since urban
Catholic schools tended to be religiously heterogeneous.7 5 Particu-
sophomore finding. For the purpose of this analysis, the sophomore standing is
taken as the starting point. Thus, we find not a sustained Catholic-school advan-
tage.., but an increased Catholic-school advantage.
Id. (emphasis added).
7' Families and Schools, 16 EDuc. RESEARCHER 32 (1987), reprinted in COLEMAN,
EQUALITY, supra note 26, at 334. Comparisons of attrition rates conducted on public and
Catholic school populations between 1980 and 1982 revealed that "in the public schools,
14.3% of sophomores had left school without graduating by 1982; in the non-Catholic pri-
vate sector, 11.9% had left; and in the Catholic sector, 3.4% had left, only a fourth to a
third as many as in the other two sectors." Id. (emphasis added).
72 Id.
73 Id. (emphasis added). In 1985, Hoffer, Greely, and Coleman confirmed the "Catholic
school advantage" as a result of a series of longitudinal studies of sophomore and seniors in
American high schools. Hoffer et al., supra note 62, at 302. They suggested that "social
capital" enables the Catholic schools to make certain demands on minority students not
made in public schools. Id.
Catholic schools place in an academic track many students whose sophomore
achievement would relegate them to a general or vocational track in public
schools. Catholic schools demand more homework and advanced coursework, espe-
cially from those who are disadvantaged in one way or another and especially from
those who are not in the academic track .... Catholic schools are especially bene-
ficial to the least-advantaged students-the minorities, the poor, and those whose
initial achievement is low. For these students, the lack of structure, lower de-
mands, and lower expectations found in many public schools are especially
harmful.
Id.
I' See Families and Schools, supra note 71, at 334-35.
71 See, e.g., Brief for the Catholic League of Religious and Civil Rights at 4-13, Mueller
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larly notable was that the dropout rate in Jewish and Protestant
schools, which tended to be religiously homogeneous but also per-
meated with a sense of community, was almost identical to that of
the Catholic schools. 6
Currently, parochial schools serve as the only financially real-
istic option open to children from low- and middle-income families
in many of the nation's largest urban areas. Without parochial
schools, hundreds of thousands of these children essentially would
be deprived of an equal educational opportunity. Because this ef-
fort is financed almost entirely by parents and the church, the so-
ciety at large, in particular the government and private business
sector, is receiving an untold financial benefit.77
2. Parents As the Primary Educators
The parental right to select the kind of school children attend,
provided that the school meets state-imposed standards for secular
instruction, has long been recognized under the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause. In Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 8
the Court struck down an Oregon statute that mandated public
v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (No. 82-195) (noting that although most parochial schools af-
fected by Minnesota tax deduction were Roman Catholic, many students similarly affected
were not; 53% of blacks in inner-city Catholic schools are Protestant and 31% of entire
school population is Protestant); see also supra note 27 and accompanying text (discussing
parochial schools as educational alternative for many non-Catholics). Nationwide, Catholics
constitute about 90% of the Catholic school population. Seventeen percent of Catholics at-
tend Catholic schools, and 81% of Catholics attend public schools. See COLEMAN, WELFARE
STATE, supra note 26, at 253-54.
Moreover, Coleman discovered that "Catholic students in public schools who attended
church regularly had considerably lower dropout rates than did Catholic students who never
attended church, but the dropout rates for both were much higher than for their counter-
parts in Catholic schools." Families and Schools, supra note 71, at 335.
76 See Families and Schools, supra note 71, at 335.
77 See An Education President for All?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1991, at Al. Recognizing
the contribution, President George Bush has unveiled "America 2000," a strategy calling for
corporate and private investment in the nation's schools, including the parochial schools. Id.
In response, parochial schools have made attempts to secure private funding. For example,
Archbishop of New York John Cardinal O'Connor has announced plans to raise $100 million
from corporate sources to keep parochial schools open in the poor areas of New York. See
Goldman, supra note 25, at B7. Nevertheless, the response has not been limited to major
urban areas. In response to America 2000, Bishop John G. Vlazny of Winona, Minnesota
formed the "Bishop's Committee on the future of Catholic Secondary Education in
Winona," which would identify sources of corporate and private funding for the Winona
parochial schools. See Press Release, Bishop Appoints Committee To Plan 'Bold New Fu-
ture' for Cotter High (Aug. 20, 1991) (available through Public Info. Office, St. Mary's
College).
78 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
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school attendance and held that "[t]he fundamental theory of lib-
erty upon which all governments in this Union repose excludes any
general power of the State to standardize its children by forcing
them to accept instruction from public teachers only. ' 79 The Court
reasoned that "[t]he child is not the mere creature of the State;
those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, cou-
pled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for addi-
tional obligations."80 Similarly, in Prince v. Massachusetts,," the
Court stated that "[i]t is cardinal with us that the custody, care
and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary
function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state
can neither supply nor hinder." '
The Pierce Court justified its position under the doctrine of
Meyer v. Nebraska.s3 In Meyer, the Court recognized that parents
are entrusted with a "natural duty" to educate children. 4 It is in-
teresting to observe that the Court plainly acknowledged a "natu-
ral parental right" that is protected under the due process proviso
but that transcends the parameters of the Constitution. 5 Although
" Id. at 535.
8o Id.
81 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
82 Id. at 166. The Court's recognition of the fundamental responsibility and right of
parents to educate their children is consistent with the teaching of the Catholic Church. The
Second Vatican Council in the Document Gravissimum Educationis 3 stated that "[s]ince
parents have conferred life on their children, they have a most solemn obligation to educate
their offspring. Hence, parents must be acknowledged as the first and foremost educators of
their children." THE DOCUMENTS OF VATICAN II 637, 641 (Walter M. Abbott ed., 1966); see
also 1983 CODE c.226, § 2 ("Because they gave life to their children, parents have the most
serious obligation and right to educate them.").
'3 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
"4 Id. at 400.
8 See Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35. The questions of whether there is in fact a natural
law, and, if so, its proper relationship to the positive law, are far beyond the entirely more
modest scope of this discussion. Suffice it to say that Saint Thomas Aquinas, building prin-
cipally on the thought of Aristotle, argued that certain general, transcendent, and universal
principles "written on the hearts of all" were available to the human mind through the use
of right reason. AQUINAS, supra note 56, I-I1, q. 94, art. 6; see also Edward S. Corwin, The
"Higher Law" Background of American Constitutional Law, 42 HARv. L. REV. 149, 365-409
(1928-29) (discussing natural law theory of Locke and Jefferson); FINNIs, supra note 48, at
134-93 (excellent contemporary argument in favor of natural law theory and discussion of its
correct relation to positive law).
The role of natural law theory in the Court's jurisprudence is the subject of a long-
standing debate. In 1798, Justices Chase and Iredell expressed opposing positions in Calder
v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798). Writing for the majority, Justice Chase reasoned that the
goal of any positive law was "to establish justice, to promote the general welfare, to secure
the blessings of liberty, and to protect their persons and property from violence." Id. at 388.
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today it may no longer be fashionable for the Supreme Court to
invoke natural law, it does not seem unreasonable to suggest that
the constitutional guarantee has a connection to some conception
of a more basic moral order.88 The conception of the moral order
articulated in Pierce seemed to presume an entire structure of so-
cial and economic organization with the traditional family as its
basic building block.
Coleman has studied numerous factors that indicate a decline
in the traditional family structure, with profound implications for
society and education.8 7 One of the most telling is the gradual but
steady increase in households without young children. Census Bu-
reau statistics demonstrate that in 1870, only about twenty-five
He held that a post facto law contrary to these goals could not "be considered a rightful
exercise of legislative authority." Id. To the contrary, Justice Iredell argued that the Court
did not have the power to invalidate legislation "merely because it is, in their judgment,
contrary to the principles of natural justice." Id. at 398 (Iredell, J., concurring). He reasoned
that "[tihe ideas of natural justice are regulated by no fixed standard: the ablest and the
purest men have differed upon the subject." Id.
Iredell may have been prophetic. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Hugo Black, and Felix Frank-
furter all denied any validity to such a philosophical basis to the Court's jurisprudence. To
the contrary, Roscoe Pound, Learned Hand, and William 0. Douglas maintained that the
natural law was indispensable. Until the mid-twentieth century, it was not unusual for the
Court to justify its holdings on the basis of the natural law. For an insightful analysis of the
Court's expressed and implicit reliance on natural law theory, particularly with regard to its
decisions upholding racial equality and freedom of speech, see JOHN FOLEY, NATURAL LAW,
NATURAL RIGHT AND THE "WARREN COURT" (1965).
11 See RONALD M. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 149 (1977) (arguing that moral
philosophy is essential to coherent theory of individual rights against state and recom-
mending work of Rawls, see supra note 64, to constitutional lawyers). A term such as "moral
theory" is usually intended to signify a method of reason or analysis that yields general
principles-or rules where possible-that transcend the case at bar and treat like cases
alike. Cf. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 87 (1970)
(suggesting that constitutional decisions must rely on "the method of reason familiar to the
discourse of moral philosophy").
" See Families and Schools, supra note 71, at 327-28. Describing the shift in the role
of the family in American society, Coleman suggests that the implications are less than
positive:
In the old social structure, dependency was not a public phenomenon. The
streets of New York and Philadelphia were not populated with homeless men and
women, and foster care institutions were not populated with children who had two
live and healthy parents. Dependency was absorbed by the family and its exten-
sions. Families took care of their aged; unmarried men and women lived in the
households of their married siblings, as aunts and uncles; and children were fully
ensconced within the household.
In short, the household was the principal welfare institution of society. Be-
yond the household were the extended family and kin group, and they constituted
the secondary, or backup welfare institution in society.
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percent of all American households had no children under the age
of eighteen.8 This percentage has significantly increased in each
succeeding year, such that by 1980 approximately sixty-five per-
cent of all households were without children under eighteen
years.89 In a parallel development, the number of households with
two wage earners and no children has markedly increased since
1970.90 Concurrently, children under five years of age became the
age group in the general population with the highest percentage of
poverty.9 1 If this trend continues, these children are likely to grow
up in single-parent families.92 It follows that the schools will be
populated with increased numbers of children from low-income
families, and, as previously discussed, children from such families
are not often afforded equal opportunity in education.
When the disadvantages confronting children from low income
families are considered in conjunction with the advantage offered
by parochial school education, perhaps there is cause to recall the
natural parental right.9 3 Faced with inadequate funds, many low-
income parents often have no choice but to place their children in
public schools with an established record of inadequate education.
The absence of choice prolongs the poverty cycle. It is precisely the
parochial school's ability to create a community environment that
provides the social capital to compensate for the decline in the
traditional family structure and to enable the learning of funda-
mental educational skills. Thus, a partial solution may lie in a re-
trieved recognition of the crucial societal role of local, nongovern-
mental institutions such as the parochial school.
3. Free Exercise and the Emergence of the "Hybrid Case
Doctrine"
As a corrective to the Court's exclusive focus on the Establish-
" Id. at 329.
" Id. at 328.
I d.
0, Id. (citing Samuel H. Preston, Children and the Elderly, 251 Sci. Am. 44-49 (1984)).
92 Cf. id. (unmarried parents and their children lived with "their married siblings" in
old social structures).
03 See Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 813-14
(1973) (White, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the Constitution entitles parents to send their children to nonpublic schools, secular or sec-
tarian, if those schools are sufficiently competent to educate the child in the necessary secu-
lar subjects."); see also Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 663 (1971) (White, J., concurring
in part, dissenting in part) (discussing parental rights under Constitution).
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ment Clause, Justice White has reasoned that the Court's ap-
proach to the parochial school aid cases must not omit a proper
understanding of the free exercise of religion.94 In a recent case,
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Ore-
gon v. Smith,95 the Court found no violation of the Free Exercise
Clause when a person who used peyote as part of a religious prac-
tice was denied unemployment benefits after being discharged for
using an illegal substance." In reaching its decision, the Court re-
fused to evaluate the free-exercise claim under the compelling gov-
ernmental interest test articulated in Sherbert v. Verner.9 7 Justice
Antonin Scalia, writing for the majority, suggested that the com-
pelling governmental interest test was strictly limited to unem-
ployment claims such as the one brought in Sherbert, where the
petitioner was discharged for refusing to work on the Sabbath, and
did not apply to discharge for the use of peyote.98 Pursuant to
Smith, a reasonable and generally applicable law will pass consti-
tutional muster against a free-exercise claim. The Smith decision
bodes the profoundly disturbing outcome that a political majority
might now be able to impose its predilections about what religious
practice will be accommodated and to which irreligious practices
an individual must conform. 99 It was precisely such a draconian
scenario that Madison's postulation of the multiplicity of sects and
interests in a vigorous social pluralism was intended to preclude. 100
Almost concomitantly with the promulgation of the Smith de-
cision, Professor Michael McConnell persuasively argued that free-
exercise exemptions from general laws were a constitutive feature
" See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 665 (White, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (Free
Exercise Clause coexists with Establishment Clause in First Amendment and therefore
should be afforded deference).
494 U.S. 872 (1990).
'e Id. at 890.
See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Smith, 497 U.S. at 882-90.
See Smith, 494 U.S. at 876-78, 884 (even if application of Sherbert balancing test
was extended, it would not be used to "require general exemptions from a generally applica-
ble criminal law").
11 In the wake of the Smith decision, legislation was introduced in Congress to reverse
its feared effects. For an analysis of the proposed law, the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act, see Mark Chopko & John Liekweg, Remedying a High Court Threat to Religious Lib-
erty, 21 ORIGINS (June 27, 1991). Alternatively, perhaps the Smith opinion is quite fact-
specific, and as much, is intended only to prevent citizens from justifying the use of other-
wise illegal narcotics on first amendment grounds. If the holding was intended only to ad-
dress the particular case before the court in Smith, then it could be argued that the pro-
posed legislation is unnecessary.
"I' See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
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of the church-state situation at the time of the framing of the First
Amendment.1 1 Whereas the Court in Smith expressed qualms
about approving exemptions from generally applicable law on the
basis of conscience,10 2 McConnell contended that the framers spe-
cifically designed the words "free exercise of religion" to protect
religiously motivated conduct as distinct from secular claims of
conscience."'3
The language of the Smith opinion intimates that an excep-
tion to the reasonableness standard of review is in order for cases
that involve the "[f]ree exercise clause . .. in conjunction with
other constitutional protections, such as ... the right of parents
* . . to direct the education of their children .. ..*",,o The Court
expressly identified Wisconsin v. Yoder' 05 as such a "hybrid situa-
tion."10 In Yoder, Amish parents of high-school age children suc-
cessfully challenged Wisconsin's compulsory education law on free-
exercise grounds. Requiring an exception to the reasonable state
law, the Court invoked the Free Exercise Clause, stating that the
Amish parents opposed the law because they found conventional
high-school education contrary to the religious development of
their young.' Citing Pierce, the Court further justified its holding
on the ground of parents' right as primary educators under the
Due Process Clause: "The history and culture of Western civiliza-
tion reflect a strong tradition of parental concern for the nurture
202 See Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Ex-
ercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1409, 1415, 1436-54 (1990) ("[E]xemptions were within
the contemplation of the framers and ratifiers as a possible interpretation of the [F]ree
[E]xercise [C]lause."). Realizing the lack of scholarly work on the subject, McConnell sought
to analyze the history of the Free Exercise Clause in an attempt to gain insight into the
framers' intent. See id. at 1414-15.
202 Smith, 494 U.S. at 882 ("Our cases do not at their farthest reach support the pro-
position that a stance of conscientious opposition relieves an objector from any colliding
duty fixed by a democratic government.") (quoting Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437,
461 (1971)).
203 McConnell, supra note 101, at 1480-1511. In discussing the Legislature's choice of
words in drafting the First Amendment, McConnell noted that "[b]y deleting references to
'conscience,' the final version of the [Flirst [A]mendment singles out religion for special
treatment." Id. at 1491.
,04 Smith, 494 U.S. at 881.
,05 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
, See Smith, 494 U.S. at 881-82. The Court's use of the term "hybrid" seems to mean
that each "ancestor" is a sine qua non of the result (e.g., a nectarine). However, if the same
result would happen even if only one ancestor is present (the due process right), one must
wonder how this is a hybrid.
207 Yoder, 406 U.S. at 223 (Amish oppose formal public education beyond eighth grade
"because it comes at the child's crucial adolescent period of religious development").
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and upbringing of their children. This primary role of the parents
in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond de-
bate as an enduring American tradition."' 08 Although it seems that
the Court will require exceptions to a generally applicable law
where free exercise and due process considerations come together,
it remains to be seen whether such a hybrid situation might call for
judicial deference to a legislative program of parochial school aid.
Given Justice White's position on the role of free-exercise con-
siderations in the parochial school aid cases, he might be inclined
to apply the hybrid case doctrine. The parental choice between
purely secular education and secular education that includes a reli-
gious component may reflect fundamental differences in what it
means to be an individual. Undoubtedly, many parents believe
that a thoroughly secular environment is the optimal educational
setting for their children. During the second half of this century,
the Supreme Court's decisions with regard to the role of religion in
the public schools have attempted to protect the sensibilities of
those students who object to moments of prayer,10 9 recitations of
biblical verses," 0 the posting of the Ten Commandments in class-
rooms,"' and moments of silence for meditation."1
2
Each of these decisions can be attributed at least in part to
the Court's legitimate concern for the sensibilities of children and
their parents who object to such religious formation in a secular
school environment. Of course, the Court should protect the rights
of individuals when a government program infringes upon those
rights. For example, the Christian majority of a particular state or
locality ought not be allowed to force its religious views on adher-
ents of different faiths or on nonbelievers. At the same time, the
Court's decisions during the last forty years have in fact been suc-
cessful in eliminating religion from public education. Considered as
a whole, these decisions reflect the conception that American soci-
ety is best served by the exclusion of any recognition of a transcen-
dent being from the formal education of the vast majority of
American children.
308 Id. at 232.
300 See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424 (1962) (finding state's school prayer inconsis-
tent with Establishment Clause).
"' See School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 205 (1963) (find-
ing such recitations violative of Establishment Clause).
.. See Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41-43 (1980) (state statute had "no secular legis-
lative purpose" and therefore violated Establishment Clause).




Just as some parents prefer that their children be educated in
a thoroughly secular environment, many others believe that such
an educational environment places a grave burden on the right to
the free exercise of religion.113 For such parents, the religious edu-
cation of their children is an integral part of the formation of the
whole person and is best conducted as a part of the entire school
curriculum. Many Americans continue to subscribe to what will be
described as the "theological anthropology" that originally moti-
vated the framing of the religion clauses." 4 Pursuant to this an-
thropology, the free exercise of religion stems from the very dignity
of the individual as a profoundly spiritual being.1 5 At the time of
the adoption of the First Amendment, education reflected the an-
thropological assumptions of the day by embracing religious train-
ing as a component of the curriculum and as a pervasive influence
in the schools." 6 Under the current arrangement, the Court has
decreed that all tax-supported education must be free of any reli-
gious instruction."' Such an arrangement leaves those who believe
that religious formation is an indispensable and inseparable part of
a child's education at a distinct disadvantage." 8
C. Summary
At its inception, the Constitution presumed a social order de-
pendent on the existence of numerous local, nongovernmental in-
stitutions as part of a vigorous social pluralism. Because the paro-
chial schools continue to exemplify such subsidiary structures, they
prove to be an invaluable component of the social fabric of the
,,3 For example, Canon 799 of the Code of Canon Law exhorts Roman Catholic parents
to send their children to schools that provide both secular and religious training, and where
parents are unable to do so, they are bound to provide religious education outside the
school. See 1983 CODE c.799.
"' See infra notes 144-171 and accompanying text. See generally ROBERT COLEs, THE
SPIRITUAL LIFE OF CHILDREN (1990) (based on 30 years of clinical observation, renowned
Harvard psychiatrist concluded that children have spiritual life, formation of which is quite
significant to their adult lives); ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL., HABITS OF THE HEART, INDIVIDUAL-
ISM AND COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE 219 (1985) ("Religion is one of the most important
ways ... in which Americans 'get involved' in the life of their community and society.").
"' See infra notes 149-72 and accompanying text.
10 See infra notes 139-43.
" See supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text.
For example, under the type of release-time program approved of by the Court in
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952), program participants must bear the burden of being
dismissed from school while it is still in session, and their respective churches must expend
all the funds needed for the program. See id. at 308-09.
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pluralistic society. For a significant number of low-income families,
the parochial schools serve as the exclusive providers of the consti-
tutionally protected rights to equal educational opportunity and
parental choice in education. 119 When either of these Fourteenth
Amendment rights is juxtaposed with the free-exercise concern,
the parochial school aid issue seems to fall under the logic of the
hybrid-case doctrine. 120 Thus, the parochial schools reflect a har-
mony of constitutional theory and praxis. If the schools failed to
fulfill important societal needs, both secular and religious, they
would not have the continued approbation of pastors and parishio-
ners who dispose of contributions, low- and middle-income families
of various races and creeds who sacrifice to pay tuition, adminis-
trators and teachers who serve at low salaries, and individuals and
organizations who donate private funds. To deny public aid to the
parochial schools is to ignore social reality.
II. LEGAL DOCTRINE: THE NEED FOR A FUNDAMENTAL REVISION
OF THE SUPREME COURT'S FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
A. Anthropological Assumptions and the First Amendment
Although the First Amendment was adopted two hundred
years ago, the rubric that has guided the Court's decisions in the
parochial school aid cases is a more recent development. Prior to
Justice White's appointment to the Supreme Court in 1962 by
President John F. Kennedy, the Court had manifested a prefer-
ence for the strict-separationist position. In 1947, the Court de-
cided the seminal case of Everson v. Board of Education,1 ' hold-
ing that it was constitutionally permissible for New Jersey to
dispense public funds to provide for the cost of transporting chil-
dren to and from parochial schools.'22 In contrast to its holding,
" See supra notes 64-77 and accompanying text.
." See supra notes 94-118 and accompanying text.
.2 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
32. Id. at 18. In Everson, the Court opined that the Establishment Clause applied to the
states. Id. at 5. The following year the Court relied on Everson to invalidate a state law
pursuant to the Establishment Clause in McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203,
210 (1948). Previously, the Court had applied the Free Exercise Clause to the states in
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940), where the conviction of persons for dis-
seminating religious literature was reversed. Id. at 311.
The issue of the incorporation of the religion clauses, however, continued to raise
thorny issues. In School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), Jus-
tice Brennan noted the special issue raised by application of the Establishment Clause to
[Vol. 66:261
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much of the language in Everson reflected the view that the reli-
gion clauses were intended to fix a strict separation between
church and state.123 Justice Black, writing for the majority, deter-
mined that a "review [of] the background and environment of the
period in which the constitutional language was fashioned''124 was
in order and ordained the following:
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment
means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government
can ... pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer
one religion over another .... No tax in any amount, large or
small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institu-
tions . . . . Neither a state nor the Federal Government can,
openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious orga-
nizations or groups and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the
clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to
erect "a wall of separation between church and state.'
'1 25
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment: such incorporation was conceptually troub-
lesome inasmuch as the First Amendment expressly prohibited Congress from establishing a
religion but at the time of the First Amendment's adoption, several of the states had, in
fact, established religions. See id. at 254-55 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan sug-
gested the issue is irrelevant because the last formal state establishment of religion had been
dissolved more than thirty years before the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified. See id. at
255. Although the incorporation issue now seems settled at least for judicial purposes, Jus-
tice Brennan's reasoning does not account for the clear historical evidence of far less than a
strict regime of separation between church and state at the time of the framing of the First
Amendment, quite apart from the issue of whether "formal establishments" existed. See
infra notes 144-73 and accompanying text. The observation of Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes seems apt: "If a thing has been practiced for two hundred years by common con-
sent, it will need a strong case for the Fourteenth Amendment to affect it...." Jackman v.
Rosenbaum Co., 260 U.S. 22, 31 (1922).
"3 See Everson, 330 U.S. at 15-16; see also Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164
(1878) (Establishment Clause intended to erect "a wall of separation between church and
state").
I"' Everson, 330 U.S. at 8.
125 Id. at 15-16 (citation omitted). The language of the majority opinion appears more
consistent with the dissenting opinion filed by Justice Rutledge than with the actual holding
of the case. Justice Rutledge'argued that the avoidance of political divisiveness among reli-
gious sects was one of the chief underpinnings of the First Amendment. Id. at 53-54 (Rut-
ledge, J., dissenting); see Paul A. Freund, Public Aid to Parochial Schools, 82 HARV. L. Rzv.
1680, 1692 (1969) (political divisiveness resulting from sectarian strife was "one of the prin-
cipal evils that the [F]irst [A]mendment sought to forestall"); see also Aguilar v. Felton, 473
U.S. 402, 414 (1985) (striking down program of state-funded and supervised remedial educa-
tion in parochial schools on ground that state supervision increases "the dangers of political
divisiveness along religious lines .... "). But see Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
At this point in the 20th century we are quite far removed from the dangers that
prompted the Framers to include the Establishment Clause in the Bill of Rights.
The risk of significant religious or denominational control over our democratic
1992]
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The dicta thus set down two rules: first, it canonized the Jefferso-
nian metaphor as the definitive truth behind the religion clauses;
and, second, it effectively bifurcated the religion clauses by imply-
ing that cases brought pursuant to the Establishment Clause could
be considered without reference to the Free Exercise Clause. In
1972, the dicta in Everson were transformed into law when they
supplied the theoretical underpinning of the Lemon standard upon
which the Court would invalidate various federal and state pro-
grams providing parochial school aid.1
2 6
1. Demythologizing the Jeffersonian Metaphor
Unwilling to acquiesce in the conventional understanding, Jus-
tice White has remarked that "one cannot seriously believe that
the history of the First Amendment furnishes unequivocal answers
to many of the fundamental issues of church-state relations."'' 27
Rather, he has suggested that "the courts have fashioned answers.
. .as best they can ... [the] history [of the Constitution] having
left them a wide range of choice among many alternatives."' 28 Jus-
tice White's incredulity is now shared by several of his col-
leagues. 2 In addition, numerous constitutional historians and aca-
demicians have expressed grievous reservations about the
processes-or even of deep political division along religious lines-is remote, and
when viewed against the positive contributions of sectarian schools, any such risk
seems entirely tolerable in light of the continuing oversight of this Court.
Id. at 400 (Powell, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (quoting Wolman v. Walter, 433
U.S. 229, 263 (1977)) (citation omitted).
'26 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 625 (1971). See generally School Dist. of
Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 381 (1985) (outlining key cases on Establishment
Clause); Woman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 253 (1977) (distinguishing Everson from Lemon on
fact that while parental reimbursements are permissible, funds to parochial schools are not);
Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825, 832 (1973) (discussing limits on Everson as enunciated in
Lemon); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 771-72
(1973) (reiterating limits of Establishment Clause as set forth in Everson and Lemon).
327 Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 820 (White, J., dissenting).
128 Id.
129 See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 576 (1989) (Kennedy, J., dissent-
ing, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and White and Scalia, JJ.) (repudiating formalism in the
application of the Lemon standard as inconsistent with history of Establishment Clause,
four member dissent stated that "[g]overnment policies of accommodation, acknowledge-
ment and support for religion are an accepted part of our political and cultural heritage");
see also Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 92 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("It is impossi-
ble to build sound constitutional doctrine upon a mistaken understanding of constitutional
history, but unfortunately, the Establishment Clause has been expressly freighted with Jef-
ferson's misleading metaphor for nearly [forty] years.").
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conventional account.' 30 Among scholars, the consensus seems to
be growing that the historical evidence neither requires the strict-
separationist position nor provides a conclusive answer to particu-
lar cases."' In the face of such significant dissatisfaction, a second
look at "the .environment and background" of the religion clauses
seems long overdue. No attempt will be made to conduct an ex-
haustive examination of the historical evidence or to derive a com-
prehensive theory of church-state relations. Rather, it suffices for
the present purposes to inquire whether the conventional account
can bear the weight of the evidence. The argument for strict sepa-
ration in Everson was based on historical authority. 3 2 If the his-
torical evidence fails to corroborate the argument, however, the de-
nial of parochial school aid cannot be sustained on this ground.
In Everson, Justice Black began by focusing almost exclusively
on the writings of Jefferson and Madison.' 33 It is true, as Black
110 See e.g., CURRY, supra note 1, at 193-222; MARK DEWOLFE HOWE, THE GARDEN AND
THE WILDERNESS 91-118 (1965); PAUL G. KAUPER, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 18 (1964);
Arlin A. Adams & Charles J. Emmerich, A Heritage of Religious Liberty, 137 U. PA. L. REV.
1559, 1646-47 (1989); Philip B. Kurland, The Origins of the Religion Clauses of the Consti-
tution, 27 WMi. & MARY L. REV. 839, 842 (1986); McConnell, supra note 101, at 1430-36. For
an earlier history, see SANFORD H. COBB, THE RISE OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN AMERICA (1968).
This Article draws heavily on the excellent historical accounts provided by McConnell and
Curry.
"I See Kurland, supra note 130, at 841-42. "History should provide the perimeters
within which the choice of meaning may be made. History ordinarily should not be ex-
pected, however, to provide specific answers to the specific problems that bedevil the
Court." Id.
,"I See Everson, 330 U.S. at 33 (Rutledge, J., dissenting) ("No provision of the Consti-
tution is more closely tied to or given content by its generating history than the religious
clause of the First Amendment.").
,"I See id. at 13. Black supported his position with a quotation from Virginia's "Bill for
Religious Liberty," which was drafted by Jefferson in 1786: "[N]o man shall be compelled to
frequent or support any religious worship, place or ministry whatsoever .... Id. (citing 12
WILLIAM W. HENING, STATUTES OF VIRGINIA 84 (1823); H.S. COMMAGER, DOcUMENTS OF
AMERICAN HISTORY 125 (1944)).
As the Ambassador to France, Jefferson was in Paris when the Continental Congress
framed the First Amendment. However, on January 1, 1802, then President Jefferson wrote
a letter to the Danbury Baptist Association expressing his views of the Establishment
Clause, and stated the commonly quoted metaphor that the First Amendment was enacted
to create 'a wall of separation between church and State'. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S.
38, 91-92 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145,
164 (1879)). Jefferson's letter was intended to express his disapproval of the establishment
of a Congregationalist church by the State of Connecticut-which continued to recognize
the established church until 1818. Clearly, Jefferson's objection to state support of a partic-
ular religion was well known when the First Amendment was framed because of the wide-
spread dissemination of his "Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom." Jefferson's influence
on the framers' thinking has been exaggerated, however; simply stated, the adoption of the
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recounted, that James Madison, a leading figure in the framing of
the Bill of Rights, had joined with Jefferson in 1785-1786 to defeat
the renewal of Virginia's tax in support of its established church.13 4
Such information, however, seems less probative of the intent be-
hind the religion clauses than an examination of the legislative
process surrounding the clauses per se. The state conventions,
which ratified the Constitution, called for a federal bill of rights. 5
In response, Congress framed the first ten amendments to the Con-
stitution, but the congressional record of the discussion surround-
ing the religion clauses is surprisingly brief."6 The legislatures of
the several states were then required to ratify the amendments. 3 7
As we shall see, Justice Black's account in Everson is at variance
religion clauses was not motivated by a unitary perspective, position, or practice. See
CHESTER J. ANTIEAU ET AL., FREEDOM FROM FEDERAL ESTABLISHMENT passim (1964). See
generally KAUPER, supra note 130, at 48-50 (discussing Jeffersonian and Madisonian ideas
of religious liberty and role they play in deciphering meaning of First Amendment).
. ' See Everson, 330 U.S. at 11-12., As Black noted, there was significant opposition to
the imposition of any tax to support members of the clergy. It was in opposition to the
Virginia establishment of the Anglican Church that Madison wrote his famous Memorial
and Remonstrance. See CURRY, supra note 1, at 143-47. At the same time in Massachusetts,
taxes for the support of ministers and "public protestant teachers of religion and morality"
were considered acceptable on the ground that "'the happiness of a people and the good
order and preservation of civil government [essentially] depend [] on piety, religion and
morality.'" Id. at 163-64.
"' See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 248-50 (1833) (noting that state gov-
ernments demanded Bill of Rights to limit power of federal government, not their own).
Early decisions of the Supreme Court indicated that no part of the Bill of Rights was in-
tended to be applicable to the states. In Barron, Chief Justice Marshall stated that the
purpose of the amendments was "security against the apprehended encroachments of the
general government-not against those of the local governments." Id. at 250. Although Bar-
ron raised the question in regard to the Fifth Amendment, Permoli v. First Municipality, 44
U.S. (3 How.) 589 (1845), specifically held that the Free Exercise Clause was inapplicable to
the states, id. at 609-10. Shortly after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment's Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause in 1868, the Court rejected the idea that the Bill of Rights was
applicable to the states. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 77-78 (1872).
Today, however, it seems indisputable that the Bill of Rights applies to all government
bodies-federal, state, and municipal. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495-96
(1954).
,3' See CURRY, supra note 1, at 199-207. Initially, Madison proposed adding the follow-
ing words to Article I, § 9 of the Constitution: "The Civil rights of none shall be abridged on
account of religious belief or worship, nor shall any national religion be established ......
See id. at 199. During its consideration by the House of Representatives, Fisher Ames sug-
gested that Madison's proposal be restated in the affirmative, and that the word "Congress"
be placed as a prefix to the clauses. Id. at 206. Based on the Ames proposal, the religion
clauses were approved by a joint House and Senate Committee in September 1789. Id. at
207. The Congressional record does not reveal the reason for the grammatical changes or the
addition of the word "Congress." Id. at 206.
, See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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with the predominant spiritual and theological understanding of
what it meant to be human at the time of the adoption of the First
Amendment. Justice Black's position is also inconsistent with the
manifestation of this pervasive anthropology in the various church-
state arrangements and in the common schools in the original
states. As one constitutional scholar put it, the "basic error ...
derives ... from its pretension that the framers spoke in a wholly
Jeffersonian dialect.... building constitutional law upon history
thus oversimplified."'""
a. Rationalist Anthropology
Diverse understandings "of human nature, human destiny and
the meaning of life" seem to have influenced the adoption of the
religion clauses.3 " Jefferson's political thought was based on Euro-
pean political theory of the Enlightenment and, in particular, on
the thought of John Locke. 40 Locke viewed the individual as an
autonomous agent who enters into a social contract with the
state. 4' According to Locke, the individual only has the capacity
to know ideas alone, and knowledge is nothing more than an ap-
prehension of the agreement or disagreement of ideas.142 This em-
phasis on the subjective and rational nature of knowledge ulti-
mately led Locke to conclude that freedom of conscience was
indispensable in matters of religious doctrine. 143  Nonetheless,
"I' HOWE, supra note 130, at 10-11; see also Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) (Harlan,
J., dissenting). As Justice Harlan stated:
[W]e have recently been reminded that the historical purposes of the religious
clauses of the First Amendment are significantly more obscure and complex than
this Court has heretofore acknowledged. Careful students of the history of the
Establishment Clause have found that "it is impossible to give a dogmatic inter-
pretation of the First Amendment, and to state with any accuracy the intention of
the men who framed it .... " Above all, the evidence seems clear that the First
Amendment was not intended simply to enact the terms of Madison's Memorial
and Remonstrance against Religious Assessments.
Id. at 125-26 (quoting ANTIEAU ET AL., supra note 133, at 142).
' John H. Mansfield, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and the Philoso-
phy of the Constitution, 72 CAL. L. REV. 847, 856-57 (1984).
140 McConnell, supra note 101, at 1430-31.
" See JOHN LocKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 269-78 (Peter Laslett ed., student
ed. 1988) (3d ed. 1698).
1" 2 JOHN LoCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 226-43 (Alexander C.
Fraser ed., 1984) (1690).
" See McConnell, supra note 101, at 1432. "Locke became an advocate of a sweeping
toleration toward religious dissenters, with the exceptions of Catholics (because of their alle-
giance to a foreign prince), atheists (because they cannot be trusted to carry out their
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Locke also argued that "the private judgment of any person con-
cerning a law enacted in political matters, for the public good, does
not take away from the obligation of that law, nor serves as a dis-
pensation.' 1 44 While professing to be a Christian, Locke urged that
Christianity be "made more rational and tolerant but less engaged
in questions of earthly significance.'
'1 45
Locke's theory, particularly as it pertained to the relationship
between church and state, exerted a significant influence on Jeffer-
son and Madison, and Jefferson was indebted to Locke for many of
the ideas expressed in the Bill for Establishing Religious Free-
dom. 146 In Virginia, where Jeffersonian thought was most influen-
tial, religious freedom had superseded the establishment of the
Anglican Church. This displacement was facilitated after the es-
tablishment church was discredited for remaining loyal to the Eng-
lish Crown during the Revolutionary War.147 Madison, who had
collaborated with Jefferson in the effort to insure religious freedom
in Virginia, later served as one of the principal architects of the
Bill of Rights in the House of Representatives. 4 s
b. Theological Anthropology
The rationalist understanding, however, was at odds with the
understanding of the individual that was operative in the lives of
the vast majority of Americans in the 1780's.'49 The prevalent the-
ological anthropology found its roots in the Reformation.'5 Reli-
gious purpose permeated all of reality, and life without a biblical
focus was simply life without salvation. 5' To be a human being
meant either to be a profoundly spiritual being predestined to in-
herit the kingdom of God or to be counted among the "nonelect,"
promises and oaths), and those who refuse to support tolerance for others." Id.
"I John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration, in 6 WORKS OF LOCKE 43 (1963). "The
government's perception of public need defines the boundaries of freedom of conscience."
McConnell, supra note 101, at 1434.
'4' McConnell, supra note 101, at 1431.
16 See id. at 1430-31.
147 Id. at 1436.
See id. at 1431.
"4 See id. at 1439-40. With the notable exception of Jefferson, most of the rationalists
were at the same time practicing Christians. Like Madison, the rationalists were comforta-
ble with the religious culture of the Congregationalists in New England and Anglicans in the
South, who were viewed by the evangelicals as uninspired and corrupted by association with
the state. Id. at 1440.




the "massa damnata.' 1 52 Whereas the civil government was
deemed necessary, the church represented the kingdom of God in
the present by pointing to what was to come.1"3
Intensity of religious belief afforded the most significant polit-
ical impetus behind the adoption of the religion clauses. 154 Evan-
gelical Protestant sects, including Baptists, Quakers, and some
wings of the Lutherans and Presbyterians, espoused the religion
clauses because they wanted freedom to practice their zealously
held religious beliefs without interference from the state. 55 The
faith of the evangelicals was enthusiastic, fervent, and often emo-
tional. 56 Dispersed throughout the original states, they were the
constituents of the great religious revival that coincided with the
founding of the new republic, and, as the number of "the elect"
increased, so too did the force of their political voice.157 The
church and its members needed to be protected from the govern-
ment and from governmental attempts to enforce conformity to
the established religious doctrine. 58 If some positive law of the
,52 This view was consistent with the theological anthropologies of Augustine of Hippo
and Martin Luther. See id. at 40-96. For contemporary presentations of anthropology based
on the Reformed theological tradition, see 2 REINHOLD NIEBUHR, THE NATURE AND DESTINY
OF MAN, A CHRISTIAN INTERPRETATION 184-204 (1964); WOLFHART PANNENBERG, ANTHROPOL-
OGY IN THEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE (Matthew J. O'Connell trans., 1985).
"I The dualism between church and state, as reflected in the idea of the "heavenly and
earthly cities," was a characteristic of both St. Augustine, THE CITY OF GOD XVIII, 49 (Ger-
ald G. Walsh, S.J. & Daniel J. Honan trans., 1954), and Martin Luther, On Secular Author-
ity: To what extent it should be obeyed, in MARTIN LUTHER 363, 368-73 (John Dillenberger
ed., 1961); see also REINHOLD NIEBUHR, CHRISTIAN REALISM AND POLITICAL PROBLEMS 124-38
(1953) (suggesting that, in Reformed understanding, while earthly empire bears marks of
egoism and strife, it nonetheless serves divine function by effecting relative degree of peace,
order, and justice).
,' See McConnell, supra note 101, at 1437-43. See generally JOHN S. WHALE, THE
PROTESTANT TRADITION (1950) (interpreting Protestant religion, its history, strengths, and
weaknesses).
"5' McConnell, supra note 101, at 1439.
156 Id.
111 See id, at 1440.
"I' See HOWE, supra note 130, at 6-11. Howe identified two salient and diverse strands
that he thought characteristic of the original intent. See id. at 5-11. The first strand focused
on Jefferson's wall of separation, which was primarily intended to protect the state from
misuse as an instrument of the church. See id. at 5-7. Together with the anticlerical bias of
eighteenth-century rationalism, the history of church-state relations in colonial Virginia left
Jefferson with a distrust of organized religion, particularly when ecclesiastical authorities
interfered with public interests. Id. at 9-11. Howe suggested that the interpretation of the
framers' intent as hostile to religion tended to obscure a second interpretation which fo-
cused on preserving religious values. Id. at 10-11.
Juxtaposed with Jefferson's wall metaphor was an earlier metaphor, chiefly ascribed to
Roger Williams, which depicted church as a well-designed and maintained garden. Williams'
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state conflicted with a dictate of religious conscience, then free ex-
ercise of religion mandated that the government allow an exception
to the law.159
Although they shared a common theological anthropology, the
evangelical movement for religious freedom was in large part a re-
action to the mainstream Protestant churches.160 In New England,
the Congregationalists, descendants of the Puritan settlers, main-
tained a polity devised during the colonial era under which each
town constituted a congregation and supported the church and
minister through taxation. 6' Because the Congregationalist
churches in Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Connecticut, and
Vermont were associated with the patriots' cause during the Revo-
lutionary War, their position in the new republic when the Bill of
Rights was framed had only been strengthened.'62
In ratifying the Constitution, the Massachusetts state repre-
sentatives specifically recommended certain amendments in order
to allay "fears and apprehensions" about federal encroachments on
state power. 6 3 Massachusetts Congressman Fisher Ames proposed
the version of the religion clauses that the House of Representa-
tives sent to the Senate.' The first Congress essentially adopted
Ames' version, which became the third of the twelve proposed
amendments, the first two of which failed to be ratified by the req-
uisite number of the states.6 5 New Hampshire and Vermont were
metaphor was primarily intended to protect religion against the "wilderness" of the govern-
ment and the outside world. It could be attributed to the establishment of the episcopal
form of religion during the Reformation in England and to the Puritan's subsequent flight
to a new world to escape the state religion. Id. at 15-60.
"' See McConnell, supra note 101, at 1443-49.
o Id. at 1441-43.
'6' See CURRY, supra note 1, at 209. Curry reminds us that it is important not to project
modern conceptions of "establishment" onto the Americans of the eighteenth century:
"Americans both before and after the Revolution thought of establishment as an exclusive
government preference for one religion." Id. It follows that New Englanders did not view
their system of municipal support for the local church as an impermissible establishment of
religion, even though such an arrangement would clearly be considered so under the modern
approach to the First Amendment.
16' See COBB, supra note 130, at 483, 500; CURRY, supra note 1, at 12-13, 22, 88; McCon-
nell, supra note 101, at 1437.
163 1 JONATHAN ELLIOT, ELLIOT'S DEBATES 322-23 (reprint ed., 1937) (1836). However,
what would become the First Amendment of the Constitution was not included among those
suggested by the Massachusetts delegates.
" See CURRY, supra note 1, at 206. The proposed amendment read: "Congress shall
make no law establishing religion, or to prevent the free exercise thereof, or to infringe the
rights of conscience." Id.
"' Id. at 205-07.
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among the first eleven states that voted to ratify the remaining ten
amendments known as the Bill of Rights.' 6 In light of the popular
support the Congregationalist Churches enjoyed, it seems unlikely
that the New England delegates intended to incorporate Jeffer-
son's views on public support for religion into the Constitution.
6 7
The "republican ideology" propagated by mainstream Protes-
tant sects in New England and elsewhere conflicted with the
"nonestablished" evangelical sects.6 8 Building on a principle that
could be traced to antiquity, adherents of republicanism espoused
the ancient Greek and Roman notion that if one sought to foster
virtue in a society, religion was an indispensable component.6 9 Ac-
cordingly, the republicans sought a societal uniformity in matters
of religious doctrine as a means of preserving order and peace.
They believed that the individual was at the same time both a
loyal citizen and an orthodox believer with no conflict between the
law of the state and the precepts of the church, a view incompati-
ble with religious pluralism. 70
, ELLIOT, supra note 163, at 340.
' See CURRY, supra note 1, at 205. With regard to the members of the House of Rep-
resentatives, for example, Thomas Curry maintains that none of the members intended the
amendment to require any of the states to alter their church-state arrangements: "Clearly,
neither he [Madison] nor the members of the House detected in the proposal an invitation
to the federal government to pass judgment on existing [c]hurch-[s]tate arrangements in the
states." Id.
"8 Deeply held religious beliefs were the foremost cause of the various church-state
arrangements at the time of the First Amendment. Professor McConnell has identified four
distinct approaches to church-state relations in the original states at the time that the
amendment was adopted. See McConnell, supra note 101, at 1421-25. Together with the
arrangements in Virginia and New England states, the religious diversity of the population
in pre-Revolutionary New York and New Jersey gave rise to a policy of religious toleration
despite periodic efforts by royal governors to enforce conformity with the Anglican Church.
This was especially true in the most densely populated four counties of metropolitan New
York. By the time the Constitution was adopted, religious freedom was a fact. COBB, supra
note 130, at 501-03; CURRY, supra note 1, at 62-73; McConnell, supra note 101, at 1424-25. A
fourth type of arrangement existed in Maryland, Rhode Island, Pennsylvania, Delaware, and
North and South Carolina, all of which had been founded to accommodate different groups
of religious dissenters from mainstream Protestantism. The free exercise of religion first
emerged as a legal principle when Lord Baltimore required that colonial Maryland not dis-
turb Roman Catholics in the practice of their religion. COBa, supra note 130, at 503-07;
McConnell, supra note 101, at 1425. For a fuller explanation of the historical development
of each of the four approaches, see id. at 1430-43.
" See FORREST McDONALD, Novus ORDO SECLORUM, THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE
CONSTITUTION 191-99 (1985); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC
1776-1787 426-29 (1969).
"" See McConnell, supra note 101, at 1469 (Massachusetts, along with Connecticut,
allowed exemption from ministerial tax for Baptists and Quakers).
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For the evangelicals, the republican notion was entirely too
secular, for virtue did not belong to the political sphere but was
completely dependent on the grace of God.171 Moreover, they be-
lieved that the arrangement smacked of the union between church
and state that characterized Roman Catholicism and had thor-
oughly corrupted the gospel. Despite the similarities in their un-
derstanding of the individual, the evangelical Protestants rejected
the privileged position of the mainstream Protestant churches. In a
more anomalous union, the evangelical and rationalist interests co-
alesced to form a powerful opposition to established religion even
though their anthropological assumptions were antithetical.
172
c. Religion, Anthropology, and Education in the New Republic
Assumptions about the nature of the individual by most citi-
zens in the new republic were manifest in the order of education.
The strict-separationist view that the framers were unanimously
opposed to public support of schools that included religious in-
struction as part of their curriculum is inconsistent with the actual
situation that existed at the time of the adoption of the Bill of
Rights.' 7 The imposition of a uniform and secular system of edu-
cation that alone was entitled to public support was not the experi-
ence or expectation of the framers. As the American Jesuit, Father
John Courtney Murray, put it: "Before it was canceled out by the
rise of the modern omnicompetent society-state," there was "the
distinction between the order of politics and the order of culture,
or, in the language of time, the distinction between studium and
imperium."'74 From the time of the first European settlers to colo-
nial America to the westward expansion, formal education had
been permeated with a religious purpose.' 75 For at least the first
'" See id. at 1442.
112 See id. at 1442-43.
," James Madison argued that even adherents of a particular religion should not be
compelled to support teachers of the same religion since to do so was a deprivation of reli-
gious liberty. See THOMAS E. BUCKLEY, CHURCH AND STATE IN REVOLUTIONARY VIRGINIA,
1776-1787, at 190 (1977).
' ' MURRAY, supra note 35, at 35.
'75 See Tyack, supra note 42, at 447-48 (describing pervasive presence of Protestantism
in early American educational history, particularly in westward expansion). In 1789, the
same year in which the Bill of Rights was proposed, the Continental Congress reenacted the
Northwest Ordinance, which provided in part that "'[rleligion, morality, and knowledge
being necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means
of education shall forever be encouraged.'" CURRY, supra note 1, at 218.
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hundred years of the country's existence, education without Chris-
tian prayer, the memorization and exposition of the Decalogue, as
well as explicitly religious study of the Biblical stories would have
been unthinkable to most Americans. 176 Even as the fabric of
American society unfolded to reveal an increasing religious plural-
ism, attempts to curtail Protestant religious training were unavail-
ing.177 Since religion was as important, if not more important, a
part of the studium as mathematics or grammar, in effect a Protes-
tant establishment abided in the common schools throughout the
nineteenth century.178 American education reflected the theological
anthropology that to be human meant to be a creature of God with
a profoundly spiritual nature.
With the reform of American education that characterized the
first half of the twentieth century, the theological anthropology
was superseded by a rationalist anthropology. 179 Originating in the
,71 See HORACE MANN, TWELFTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION
(1848), reprinted in LIFE AND WORKS Op HORACE MANN 4, 311-12 (1891). Horace Mann, one
of the great advocates of public education, stated, "[O]ur system earnestly inculcates all
Christian morals; it founds its morals on the basis of religion; it welcomes the religion of the
Bible ...." Id. Prior to the Court's decision in School Dist. of Abington Township v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), which declared the recitation of the Lord's prayer and Bible
verses in the public schools constitutionally impermissible, a total of 37 states permitted
Bible reading in their respective school systems, and 17 states had statutes to this effect.
DONALD E. BOLES, THE BIBLE, RELIGION AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 48-53 (1965).
'" See McDONALD, supra note 169, at 42 ("Some of the state constitutions adopted
during the Revolution relaxed religious restraints, but so habituated were Americans to
thinking in Protestant terms that few could conceive of a civil order in any other way."). It
was not until the middle of the nineteenth century that the wave of non-Protestant Euro-
pean immigrants began to challenge this homogeneous religious culture. In 1854, a Catholic
girl was expelled from a Maine public school for refusing to read from the King James
version of the Bible. Rejecting an action brought to permit her to read from the Catholic
version of the Bible, a state appellate court declared that "[t]he right of one sect to interdict
or expurgate, would place all schools in subordination to the sect interdicting or expurgat-
ing." Donahue v. Richards, 38 Me. 376, 407 (1854). In 1859, Thomas Wall, a Roman Catholic
boy attending a Boston Public School, was beaten by his teacher when he refused to read
from a Protestant version of the Bible. When an action for battery was brought against the
teacher, a Boston Court upheld the validity of the teacher's action. See 2 ROBERT H. LORD,
A HISTORY OF THE ARCHDIOCESE OF BOSTON, 601-05 (1945). The practice of compulsory bible-
reading enforced through corporeal punishment continued in Massachusetts until as late as
1865. Id.
1 See Tyack, supra note 42, at 447; see also ALEXIS DE ToCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN
AMERICA 320 n.4 (1958) (observing that in America "almost all education is entrusted to the
clergy"); Martin E. Marty, Living with Establishment and Disestablishment in Nine-
teenth-Century Anglo-America, 18 J. OF CHURCH & ST. 61-77 (1976) (suggesting existence of
general Protestant establishment in nineteenth-century America).
"I See BOLES, supra note 176, at 32-33 (growing opposition to sectarian instruction in
public schools became increasingly evident during last half of nineteenth century).
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Enlightenment, the rationalist anthropology did not remain static.
Its subjective focus evolved so that the person is now understood
as a radically autonomous individual who is often defined primar-
ily by political ideology and the assertion of individual rights
against the state.8 0 Given the secular and political understanding
of the person, belonging to a traditional religious community,
which includes submitting to its creed, has become alien and arti-
factual.' 8 ' Consistent with the evolved rationalist anthropology and
its implications for education, the twentieth-century reformers put
their faith in secular schools as the optimal learning environ-
ment. 82 While secularization was a legitimate response to the nec-
essary demise of the de facto Protestant establishment, it seems
fair to surmise that the vast majority of eighteenth- and nine-
teenth-century Americans, including the religious rationalist,
would neither recognize the aculeated anthropology as their own
8I Id. at 33. This view corresponds with the thought of John Rawls. Adopting Locke's
starting point, Rawls posits a rational individual who is not in relationship to others or to
any community save for the decision to enter the social contract. RAWLS, supra note 64, at
11-16. He postulates the principle that "each person is to have an equal right to the most
extensive basic liberty compatible with similar liberty for others." Id. at 60. A departure
from the principle "cannot be justified by, or compensated for, by greater social and eco-
nomic advantages." Id. at 61.
The implications of this precept were recently demonstrated when the American Civil
Liberties Union ("ACLU") and the National Organization of Women ("NOW") persuaded a
federal district court in Detroit to declare unconstitutional a Detroit public school plan to
establish three all-male academies. The plan was effected to improve the alarmingly low test
scores and the high drop-out rate among black boys in the city's high schools. Despite this
urgent educational goal, the ACLU and NOW successfully argued that the plan discrimi-
nated against girls. U.S. Judge Blocks Plan for All-Male Public Schools in Detroit, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 16, 1991, at A10.
18' See BELLAH ET AL., supra note 114, at 163. Robert Bellah and his associates de-
scribed the incompatibility between participation in traditional communities and the
evolved rationalist perspective:
Viewing one's primary task as "finding oneself" in autonomous self-reliance, sepa-
rating oneself not only from one's parents but also from those larger communities
and traditions that constitute one's past, leads to the notion that it is in oneself,
perhaps in relation to a few intimate others, that fulfillment is to be found. Indi-
vidualism of this sort often implies a negative view of public life. The impersonal
forces of the economic and political worlds are what the individual needs protec-
tion against .... [I]t would seem that this quest ... is illusory: it often ends in
emptiness instead.
Id.
82 See JOHN DEWEY, HUMAN NATURE AND CONDUCT 330 (1922). John Dewey opined that
creating a sense of community in the school was obstructed by religion. Adherence to "cults,
dogmas and myths," he argued, stifled individualism and caused one to lose a "sense of
community and one's place in it." Id.; see also JOHN DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION
327-28, 340-56 (1916).
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nor approve of its irreligious implications for American education.
To suggest that the original intent predetermined the eventual sec-
ularization of public education and proposed the limitation of pub-
lic aid to such schools is plainly spurious.
2. Reuniting the Two Religion Clauses
The second erroneous rubric implicit in the Everson dicta and
later adopted as law in Lemon is that the religion clauses are in-
tended to function as unconnected, autonomous, and distinct pro-
visions. To supplant the Court's exclusive focus on the Establish-
ment Clause, Justice White has admonished his colleagues to recall
that the two clauses "coexist" in the First Amendment, and "the
latter is surely relevant in cases such as these."'18 3 At the least, he
has suggested that
[w]here a state program seeks to ensure the proper education of
its young, in private as well as public schools, free exercise consid-
erations at least counsel against refusing support for students at-
tending parochial schools simply because in that setting they are
also being instructed in the tenets of the faith they are constitu-
tionally free to practice.
8 4
The bifurcation of the religion clauses in the parochial school
aid cases is incorrect for two reasons. First, to interpret the prohi-
bition against establishment as a categorical absolute and to en-
force it without regard to its effects on other constitutional guaran-
tees is to adopt an analysis contrary to long-accepted principles of
constitutional law. For example, when the Court considers chal-
lenges to other First Amendment guarantees such as the free exer-
cise of religion,"8 5 and the freedoms of'speech and association,'8s it
,83 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 665 (1971) (White, J., concurring in part, dissent-
ing in part).
184 Id.
'" See, e.g., Employment Div. Dep't of Human Servs. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,
879 (1990) (free exercise right involving religious use of peyote does not relieve individual of
obligation to comply with "valid and neutral law of general applicability" that proscribes
use of peyote); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 712 (1986) (free exercise claim that appellees
entitled to exemption from Food Stamp program's Social Security number requirement
weighed against public interest in maintaining efficient and fraud-resistant system); Sher-
bert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 408-09 (1963) (free exercise right violated where unemployment
compensation rules substantially burdened sabbath observance and were not justified by
compelling government interest).
" See, e.g., United States v. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. 3115, 3121-22 (1990) (free speech
right to solicit on behalf of political organization not violated by reasonable governmental
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,generally prefers to balance competing interests rather than to de-
velop absolute rules. The Lemon standard, however, requires the
Court to focus solely on the prohibition of an establishment.
The Court has not always interpreted the Establishment
Clause without regard to free-exercise considerations. In a 1952 de-
cision, Zorach v. Clauson,18 7 the Court shifted from the strict-sepa-
rationist dicta of Everson to a more benevolent voice. Zorach up-
held the validity of a New York City program which required
public schools to release students, upon request of their parents,
from attendance for a certain time period each week so that those
students could attend religious instruction and devotional exer-
cises.1 8 Justice William 0. Douglas eloquently stated for the
majority:
We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Su-
preme Being. We guarantee the freedom to worship as one
chooses. We make room for as wide a variety of beliefs and creeds
as the spiritual needs of man deem necessary. We sponsor an atti-
tude on the part of the government that shows no partiality to
any one group and that lets each flourish according to the zeal of
its adherents and the appeal of its dogma. When the state encour-
ages religious instruction or cooperates with religious authorities
by adjusting the schedule of public events to sectarian needs, it
follows the best of our traditions. For it then respects the reli-
gious nature of our people and accommodates the public service
to their spiritual needs. To hold that it may n6t would be to find
in the Constitution a requirement that the government show a
callous indifference to religious groups. That would be preferring
those who believe in no religion over those who do believe."88
Only five years after the Everson opinion, the Court seemed to
be suggesting that accommodation of religion was part of the un-
derlying philosophy of the constitutional guarantee of religious
freedom.'90 Moreover, the juxtaposition of the description of Amer-
regulation prohibiting such activity outside post office); Young v. New York City Transit
Auth., 903 F.2d 146, 157 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 516 (1990) (panhandlers alleged
First Amendment speech interest outweighed by governmental interest in efficient and safe
operation of New York City subways).
,87 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
, Id. at 315.
, Id. at 313-14.
,90 Id. at 314. Justice Douglas stated that although the government may not constitu-
tionally "finance religious groups," there is "no constitutional requirement which makes it
necessary for government to be hostile to religion and to throw its weight against efforts to
widen the effective scope of religious influence." Id.
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ican social reality in Zorach with the strict-separationist tenets set
out in Everson points to a tension between anti-establishment and
free-exercise values in the Court's decisions.1 91
This tension manifests itself in the majority and dissenting
opinions in Board of Education of Central Schools District No. 1
v. Allen.'9' Here, the Court upheld the constitutional validity of a
New York State statute that authorized officials of the public
schools to distribute certain secular textbooks to all private
schools, including parochial schools.'93 In a rare opportunity to
write for the majority in a parochial school aid case, Justice White
stressed the judicial emphasis owed to New York State's judgment
that the provision of secular textbooks would aid the private
schools in providing quality secular education.'
Three Justices dissented in separate opinions. Invoking the
strict-separationist language of Everson, Justice Black acerbically
asserted that the New York law was the work of "powerful secta-
rian religious propagandists ... looking toward complete domina-
tion and supremacy of their particular brand of religion.' 95 Not-
withstanding his words in Zorach, Justice Douglas now expressed
anguish that the majority holding would somehow further the abil-
ity of parochial schools to teach that "[t]he Crusades," "the
slaughter of the Aztecs by Cortes," and "Franco's revolution in
Spain," inter alia, were justified on religious grounds. 96 In a less
colorful and briefer dissent, Justice Abe Fortas argued that the
provision of secular textbooks to parochial schools was not within
the principle of Everson.197 In our pluralistic society, there are go-
ing to be divergent viewpoints on the value of religion and of reli-
gious education.9 8 If the inclusion of the Free Exercise Clause in
the First Amendment means anything, however, it indicates that
," See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 658 (1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting
in part) ('When the state encourages religious instruction ... it follows the best of our
traditions.') (quoting Zorach, 343 U.S. at 313-14); see also MURRAY, supra note 35, at 153
("There is ... every reason for applying in the area of education the fully developed princi-
ple of accommodation of the public service to the genuine spiritual needs of our religious
people.").
192 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
I"' Id. at 248.
194 Id. at 243-48.
'" Id. at 251 (Black, J., dissenting).
'" Id. at 260-61 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
... Id. at 271 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
199 Cf. BELLAH ET AL., supra note 114, at 219-49 (religion has always been and continues
to be "one of the most important" aspects of American life).
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the First Amendment was not intended to engender hostility or to
perpetuate prejudice against those individuals and communities
who wish to practice their faith, thereby placing a great value upon
the religious education of their young.199
Second, the bifurcation of the religion clauses has resulted in a
betrayal of their intended purpose. In the words of the First
Amendment historian, Monsignor Thomas Curry: "[T]o see the
two clauses as separate, balanced, competing, or carefully worked
out prohibitions designed to meet different eventualities would be
to read into the minds of the actors far more than was there.
20 0
The bifurcation obscures the fundamental historical reality that
the framers opposed an establishment precisely because of their
desire to protect individual conscience in religious matters.2 1 The
Protestant perspective that gave rise to the religion clauses recog-
nized a definite link between the Constantinian establishment of
Catholicism and the following fifteen centuries of coerced ortho-
doxy to corrupted doctrine. 0 2 One aim of the religion clauses was
to insure that such tyranny be prevented in the new republic.
The enactment of religious freedom in many of the original
states and the exemptions allowed in those states that maintained
official churches reflect an accommodation of religious beliefs. Be-
cause the framers understood the religion clauses as a unitary pro-
vision, the interpretation of the Establishment Clause was never
intended to eviscerate the Free Exercise Clause. Neither intended
to engender state hostility towards religion nor to propagate a sec-
ular state,203 a large part of the actual purpose of the religious
' See generally Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 433-34 (1962) ("It has been argued that
to apply the Constitution in such a way as to prohibit state laws respecting an establishment
of religious services in public schools is to indicate a hostility toward religion .... Nothing,
of course, could be more wrong.").
'10 CURRY, supra note 1, 216. "One will look in vain for the analytical distinctions schol-
ars presume the generation that enacted the First Amendment made .... To examine the
two clauses of the amendment as a carefully worded analysis of Church-State relations
would be to overburden them." Id. at 216.
20I See Engel, 370 U.S. at 433. "It was in a large part to get completely away from this
sort of systematic religious persecution that the Founders brought into being our Nation,
our Constitution, and our Bill of Rights with its prohibition against any governmental es-
tablishment of religion." Id. Note, however, that the Engel Court struck down an official
prayer for New York public schools despite the fact that it was not denominational. See id.
202 See CURRY, supra note 1, at 144. Moreover, Americans of this period were keenly
aware and thoroughly frightened by the fact that England had only recently approved the
imposition of Catholicism as the official religion in Quebec. See id. at 174, 209.
203 See Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 395 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
I am disturbed as much by the overtones of the Court's opinion as by its actual
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clauses was to protect the interests of religion from the state. To
adopt the modern rationalist anthropology would be to construe
the religion clauses in such a way that denies the very primacy of
religion that the evangelicals sought to insure.
The notion that the free exercise of religion demands some de-
gree of accommodation is perhaps one of the greatest contributions
of the Constitution. The enduring heritage of this concept is evi-
dent in the fact that it was adopted by the Roman Catholic
Church at the Second Vatican Council:
[T]he human person has a right to religious freedom. This free-
dom means that all men are to be immune from coercion on the
part of individuals or of social groups and any human power, in
such wise that in matters religious no one is to be forced to act in
a manner contrary to his own beliefs. Nor is anyone to be re-
strained from acting in accordance with his own beliefs, whether
privately or publicly, whether alone or in association with others,
within due limits.
... [T]he right to religious freedom has its foundation in the
very dignity of the human person .... This right of the human
person to religious freedom is to be recognized in the constitu-
tional law whereby society is governed. 20 4
Several paragraphs later, the document admonishes that the state
must foster religious life by creating conditions favorable to reli-
gious formation. 0 5 It is perhaps ironic that while the concept has
been embraced by the very institution whose alleged abuses it was
designed to prevent, it has been excluded from a major aspect of
American church-state law.
holding. The Court apparently believes that the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment not only mandates religious neutrality on the part of the government
but also requires that this Court go further and throw its weight on the side of
those who believe that our society as a whole should be a purely secular one.
Nothing in the First Amendment or in the cases interpreting it requires such an
extreme approach.
Id.
204 Declaration on Religious Freedom: On the Right of the Person and of Communities
to Social and Civil Freedom in Matters Religious, 2, in THE DOCUMENTS OF VATICAN II, at
678-79 (Walter M. Abbott ed., 1966). The American Jesuit John Courtney Murray was one
of the principal authors of the document. For his own account of the legislative history of
the text, see JOHN C. MURRAY, S.J., RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: AN END AND BEGINNING 15-42
(1966).
2I See Declaration on Religious Freedom, supra note 204, at 5-6.
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3. Summary
Both the canonization of the Jeffersonian metaphor and the
bifurcation of the religion clauses are clearly erroneous rubrics: the
former because it is a reduction of the complex historical situation
that gave rise to the amendment, 0 6 and the latter because it im-
poses a legal formalism on the provision that eviscerates the true
meaning."' Contrary to the implicit assumptions of the conven-
tional historical account, most of the framers of the First Amend-
ment did not share the rationalist anthropology of the Enlighten-
ment but espoused instead the theological anthropology of the
Reformation.2 08 Their anthropological viewpoint was reflected in
the schools that were permeated with a sense of Christian faith.209
Thus, even assuming arguendo that Justice Black had ad-
vanced a prima facie case on the basis of the writings of Jefferson
and Madison, the evidence is considerably more complex than al-
lows for a unitary voice, Jeffersonian or otherwise. To the extent
that it is an argument dependent on historical authority, the strict-
separationist reading of the religion clauses fails to bear the weight
of the evidence.21 0 A more thorough review of the "background and
environment of the period in which that constitutional language
was fashioned" 211 lends credence to Justice White's position that
history simply lacks definitive answers to the sensitive and com-
plex issues raised today by the religion clauses. Specifically con-
cerning the issue of parochial school aid, considerations of public
policy ought to be the focus of discussion, rather than a quest for.
an unachievable rule based on original intent.
206 See generally Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 92 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
("It is impossible to build sound constitutional doctrine upon a mistaken understanding of
constitutional history, but unfortunately the Establishment Clause has been expressly
freighted with Jefferson's misleading metaphor for 40 years.").
20. See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
208 See Wallace, 472 U.S. at 95-99 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (detailing statements
made during House debates on religion clauses).
209 See id. at 95-98 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
2 0 See id. at 113 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("As its history abundantly shows ...
nothing in the Establishment Clause requires government to be strictly neutral between
religion and irreligion, nor does that Clause prohibit Congress or the States from pursuing
legitimate secular ends through nondiscriminatory sectarian means.").
2I Everson, 330 U.S. at 18.
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B. Requiem for Lemon
1. Piercing the Veil of Neutrality
It has been suggested that the Supreme Court's decisions "in
the sensitive area encompassed by the two religion clauses of the
[F]irst [A]mendment" ought to be guided by "neutral principles"
so as to "rest 'on analysis and reasons quite transcending the im-
mediate result that is achieved.' ",212 By framing the three-pronged
Lemon standard, the Court endeavored to set down neutral princi-
ples to delineate what constitutes an impermissible establishment
of religion.2 13 In cases challenging the constitutionality of public
aid to parochial schools,. the Court has predicated its decisions on
the ostensibly neutral issues: "purpose, effect and entangle-
ment. '214 The Court has, in fact, refused to consider factors
outside the scope of the Lemon standard such as the secular merit
of the parochial schools. 215 The Court also eschews the inclusion of
considerations raised by the free exercise clause in the constitu-
tional calculus.
212 Donald A. Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Develop-
ment: The Religious Liberty Guarantee (pt. 1), 80 HARV. L. REV. 1381, 1381 (1967) (quoting
Herbert Wechsler, Towards Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L. REV. 1,
15 (1959)). However, Wechsler's suggestion about discerning neutral principles has been
criticized on the grounds that such an approach "does not by itself tell us anything useful
about the appropriate content of those principles or how the Court should derive the values
they embody." JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 55 (1980). For his part, Giannella
seems to have been well aware that the Court's decisions reflected substantive value choices.
For example, he argued that the Court's establishment clause cases reflected, inter alia, the
value of "voluntarism," the position that the advancement of a church should come only
from the voluntary support of its followers and not from the political support of the state.
Giannella, supra note 53, at 516-18; see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW § 8-7, at 584 (2d ed. 1988).
2'13 See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13. Pursuant to the Lemon standard, in order to avoid
classification as an establishment of religion, a state program must: (1) reflect a secular leg-
islative purpose; (2) have a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion; and
(3) not foster excessive entanglement with religion. Id.
214 See School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 380 (1985); Meek v. Pit-
tenger, 421 U.S. 349, 358 (1975). Although insisting that the three prongs of the Lemon
standard are merely guidelines, the Court has never upheld a program of parochial school
aid after determining that one of the three prongs has been violated.
215 See, e.g., Lemon, 403 U.S. at 625 ("The merit and benefits of [parochial] schools,
however, are not the issue before us in these cases. The sole question is whether state aid to
these schools can be squared with the dictates of the Religion Clauses.").
"I6 See Ball, 473 U.S. at 383 ("The Lemon test concentrates attention on the is-
sues-purposes, effect, entanglement-that determine whether a particular state action is
an improper 'law respecting an establishment of religion.' ").
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In addition to its exclusive focus, the Lemon standard lends
itself to rigid application. 1 If a program violates any prong, the
Court must conclude that the program constitutes an establish-
ment of religion. 18 Accordingly, the Court refuses to consider the
possibility that a program's secular effect might, on balance, out-
weigh its failure to satisfy the entanglement prong.21 9 In Justice
White's view, a state's effort to "keep [its] parochial schools system
alive and capable of providing adequate secular education to sub-
stantial numbers of students" apparently would suffice. 2 The ex-
clusive focus and rigid structure of the Lemon standard belie its
neutrality and disclose the strict-separationist hostility to paro-
chial school aid it embodies. 2
2. A Corpus of Law in Disarray
Since the advent of the Lemon standard, the Court's decisions
in parochial school aid cases often appear to turn on casuistical
distinctions that yield inconsistent and unpredictable outcomes. 2
For example, instruction by a state-employed remedial teacher can
be reconciled with the framers' intent when offered to exceptional
children in a trailer parked immediately outside the parochial
school door,22' but not when the same teacher must cross the
217 See id. at 400 (White, J. dissenting); Meek, 421 U.S. at 389-94 (Rehnquist, J., dis-
senting, joined by White, J.); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413
U.S. 756, 821-24 (1973) (White, J., dissenting); Lemon, 403 U.S. at 663-69 (White, J., con-
curring in part, dissenting in part).
28 See, e.g., Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 772-73 ("[T]he now well-defined three-part test...
dictate[s] that to pass muster under the Establishment Clause the law in question first must
reflect a clearly secular legislative purpose .... second, must have a primary effect that
neither advances nor inhibits religion .... and, third, must avoid excessive government en-
tanglement with religion.") (citations omitted).
" See, e.g., id. at 774 ("[Tjhe propriety of a legislature's purposes may not immunize
from further scrutiny a law which either has a primary effect that advances religion, or
which fosters excessive entanglements between Church and State.").
220 Id. at 823 (White, J., dissenting).
221 See Note, Developments in the Law-Religion and the State, 100 HARV. L. REV.
1606, 1678-1702 (1987) (arguing that Court's application of Lemon standard in parochial
school aid cases does not reflect neutral rules, but adherence to certain "establishment
clause values" predominant among which is value of strict separation).
222 See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 110 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("Lemon
test has caused this Court to fracture into unworkable plurality opinions"); see also Jesse H.
Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U.
Pirr. L. REV. 673, 680 (1980); William P. Marshall, "We Know it When We See it" The
Supreme Court and Establishment, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 495, 495-96 (1986); Note, supra note
221, at 1606, 1677.
22 See Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 248 (1977).
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threshold and enter the parochial school to offer remedial assis-
tance to children in special need. 24 Although allowed by the Con-
stitution to reimburse parochial schools for the costs of administer-
ing state-created examinations,225 the states are forbidden to pay
for examinations created by parochial school teachers.2
Perhaps the only consistent effect of the Lemon standard has
been to reaffirm the strict-separationist tendencies of the Court.
Prior to the adoption of the Lemon test, the Court found the fol-
lowing state activities consistent with original intent: the disburse-
ment of funds to pay for parochial school students' transportation
to and from school;22 7 the supplying of parochial school students
with textbooks in secular subjects;22s and the creation of tax subsi-
dies to religious institutions.229 Subsequent to Lemon, state actions
224 See Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 412-13 (1985). The Court's entanglement analy-
sis in Aguilar seemed to rest, at least in part, on a fear of a symbolic union between the
state and any particular religious persuasion. Thus, the fact that public employees were
permitted to provide instruction in parochial schools might lead to the inference that the
state preferred a particular religion: "When the state becomes enmeshed with a given de-
nomination in matters of religious significance, the freedom of religious belief of those who
are not adherents of that denomination suffers." Id. at 409; see also Kenneth L. Karst,
Paths to Belonging: The Constitution and Cultural Identity, 64 N.C. L. REv. 303, 357-61
(1986) (suggesting that parochial school aid conveys message that nonparticipants are "out-
siders" and not "full members of the community"). In School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball,
473 U.S. 373 (1986), the Court reasoned that
[t]he inquiry into [the symbolic union] must be conducted with particular care
when many of the citizens perceiving the governmental message are children in
their formative years. The symbolism of a union between church and state is most
likely to influence children of tender years, whose experience is limited and whose
beliefs consequently are the function of environment as much as of free and vol-
untary choice.
Id. at 390 (citations omitted). The Court has concluded that college students are less sus-
ceptible to influence by the symbolic union of church and state. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vin-
cent, 454 U.S. 263, 274 n.14 (1981) (upholding state university's provision of meeting facili-
ties for religious groups). One wonders, however, whether children of "tender" and
"formative" years are any better able to distinguish the state's role of providing trailers
parked immediately outside the parochial school door, as in Wolman, from the alleged sym-
bolic union created by public employees who cross the parochial school threshold in Aguilar.
212 See Wolman, 433 U.S. at 240-41 (since neither content nor result of test under non-
public school control, program did not directly aid religion).
2 See Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472, 480-81
(1973) ("integral role of such testing in the total teaching process" means program consti-
tutes impermissible aid to religion).
2 See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947).
228 See Wolman, 433 U.S. at 236-38; Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 248 (1968).
229 See Walz v. Tax Comm'n of the City of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 667-700 (1970).
Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority in Lemon, expressed the view that its holding
could be distinguished from that of Walz on the ground that "total separation between
church and state ... is not possible in an absolute sense." Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614.
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rendered incompatible with original intent include the payment of
bus transportation of parochial school children on secular field
trips,3 0 the supplying of educational materials such as periodicals,
maps, charts, photographs, and films, 23 1 and the provision of direct
financial aid to parochial schools. 232 Thus, not only the futile at-
tempt to justify the strict-separationist position on original intent
but also the utter disarray of the Court's decisions in the parochial
school aid cases manifests the need for a fundamental revision of
the legal doctrine.
3. The Erroneous Logic of the Three Requirements
Scrutiny of the internal logic of the tripartite standard dis-
closes that it contains both a tautology and a paradox.-The former
lies in the redundancy of the secular purpose and effect require-
ments while the latter arises from the entanglement requirement.
No secular purpose and effect, no matter how compelling, have
been deemed worthy to assure judicial deference to a program of
parochial school aid. The secular purpose test is the easiest re-
quirement of the tripartite standard to satisfy, and it is rarely de-
terminative. 2"3 The Court generally accepts the legislature's state-
ment of a secular purpose.2 4 Even when a statute failed to express
This is not to suggest, however, that we are to engage in a legalistic minuet in
which precise rules and forms must govern. A true minuet is a matter of pure form
and style, the observance of which is itself the substantive end. Here we examine
the form of the relationship for the light that it casts on the substance.
Id.
230 See Wolman, 433 U.S. at 252-55.
... See id. at 229; Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 366 (1975).
212 See Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 780
(1973). Regarding the New York tuition reimbursement program, the Court stated that
"[tihere can be no question that these grants could not, consistently with the Establishment
Clause, be given directly to sectarian schools." Id.
233 See TRIBE, supra note 212, § 14-9, at 1205-11. Although Tribe does identify four
cases in which the secular purpose requirement was decisive, none of these cases concerned
parochial school aid. See id. (citing Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 585-89 (1987); Wal-
lace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 56 (1985); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41-42 (1980) (per
curiam); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103 (1968)).
_ 234 See, e.g., Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613. "[Tlhe statutes themselves clearly state that they
are intended to enhance the quality of the secular education in all schools covered by the
compulsory attendance laws. There is no reason to believe the legislatures meant anything
else." Id. In Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756
(1973), the Court found the secular purpose prong of the Lemon test to be satisfied, despite
the Court's reliance on Lemon to strike down a New York statute that provided mainte-
nance allotments to nonpublic schools, tuition reimbursements to poor parents, and tax de-
ductions to other parents who send their children to nonpublic schools. Id. at 798. "New
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a secular purpose, the Court was willing to infer one from an anal-
ysis of statutory provisions. 5 In fact, the Court has never invali-
dated a program of parochial school aid because of failure to sat-
isfy the first prong.
2 36
Justice White's understanding of the second prong is that "the
test is one of 'primary' effect not any effect. '237 He has criticized
the Court for finding the second prong violated when there is only
an "incidental" benefit to religion in the face of an overriding secu-
lar consequence.238 According to Justice White, the rule should be:
York's interest in preserving a healthy and safe educational environment for all of its
schoolchildren" was served bythe statute's provision of maintenance allotments to the non-
public schools. Id. at 773. In addition, the New York statute was found to promote "plural-
ism and diversity among its public and nonpublic schools," presumably by increasing the
economic feasibility of parochial schools and by alleviating some of the financial burden on
parents who elected to send their children to such schools. Id. Moreover, the statute's con-
cern for an overburdened public school system that would be hard-pressed to accommodate
the number of children attending nonpublic schools satisfied the requirement. Id. Thus, the
Court has indicated that legislative purposes in statutes such as that in Nyquist, although
they exclusively concern nonpublic education, are acceptable.
3I See Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394-96 (1983). In Mueller, the Court expressly
acknowledged its "reluctance to attribute unconstitutional motives to the States, particu-
larly when a plausible secular purpose for the State's program may be discerned from the
face of the statute." Id. at 394-95. After conceding that the first requirement merited little
attention, the Court concluded that Minnesota's "decision to defray the cost of educational
expenses incurred by parents-regardless of the type of schools their children at-
tend-evidences a purpose that is both secular and understandable." Id. at 395. The Court
reasoned that because "[a]n educated populace is essential to the political and economic
health of any community.... a State's efforts to assist parents in meeting the rising cost of
educational expenses plainly serves this secular purpose of ensuring that the State's citi-
zenry is well educated." Id. The Court further reasoned that '[p]arochial schools ... pro-
vide[] an educational alternative for millions of young Americans; they often afford whole-
some competition [to the] public schools, and . . . relieve substantially the tax burden
incident to the operation of public schools.' Id. (quoting Wolman v. Walters, 433 U.S. 229,
262 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)). In School Dist. of Grand
Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985), the Court made a concession similar to that in Mueller
and quickly determined that the statute at issue had a secular legislative purpose. Id. at 383;
see also Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 408-14 (1985) (Court did not even discuss first
prong of Lemon test).
"' This is not to suggest that the secular legislative purpose requirement is altogether
meaningless. It would, of course, be difficult to discern a secular purpose in a government
program that provided funds for catechisms, or religion teachers, or the construction of
school chapels. Practically speaking, however, the possibility of a state legislature adopting
such a program seems highly unlikely.
I" Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 823 (White, J., dissenting); see also TRIBE, supra note 212, §
14-10, at 1215 (arguing that requirement of primary secular effect is misnomer since Court
actually requires that any religious effect to be "remote, indirect and incidental").
"I See Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 823-24 (White, J., dissenting). In Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S.
825 (1973), the Court struck down a Pennsylvania tuition reimbursement plan that provided
funds to parents to cover the tuition expenses incurred in sending their children to nonpub-
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"[Als long as the aid to the school could fairly be characterized as
supporting the secular educational functions of the school,
whatever support to religion resulted from this direct, or indirect,
contribution to the school's overall budget ... [is] not violative of
the primary effect test or of the Establishment Clause.
'239
Justice White does not dispute that public aid of the "secular
function" performed by parochial schools "may substantially bene-
fit" their religious mission.240 He believes that "religion may indi-
rectly benefit from government aid to secular activities of churches
[without] convert[ing] that aid into an impermissible establish-
ment of religion. "241 Such a principle accords with the reality that
religious institutions do in fact receive large amounts of public aid
to provide important social services to society such as health and
child care. The secular and religious nature of such services, as well
as the fact that the religious institutions providing such services
benefit from public aid seem beyond question. Why parochial
school aid for secular instruction does not fall under the same be-
nign constitutional rubric as do other services remains to be
elucidated.
A certain redundancy is implicit within the inquiries about the
first two of the three requirements of the Lemon test. It is difficult
to imagine how a legislative program that fulfilled the secular ef-
lic schools. Id. at 830. Employing the primary effect test, the Court stressed that more than
90% of the children attending nonpublic schools in Pennsylvania attended parochial
schools. Id. Similarly, the Court invalidated the provisions of the New York statute under
scrutiny in Nyquist which allowed direct grants for tuition reimbursements to poor families
with children in nonpublic schools and established a form of tax relief for families above a
certain minimum income level. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 789-94. In reaching its decision, the
Court stated that the economic benefits of the New York law flowed primarily to parents of
children attending sectarian schools. See id. at 783.
In Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975), the Court invalidated two Pennsylvania pro-
grams that authorized lending nonpublic schools "instructional materials" (periodicals, pho-
tographs, maps, charts, sound recordings, films, or any other printed and published matter
of a similar nature), "instructional equipment" (projection equipment, recording equipment,
and laboratory equipment), and "auxiliary services" (counseling, testing, and related ser-
vices for exceptional children, for remedial students and for the educationally disadvan-
taged) because more than 75% of the benefit would go to sectarian schools. Id. at 372. The
primary effect, according to the majority, was to aid religion. Id. at 366. In a separate dis-
senting opinion, however, Justice Rehnquist argued that even if the percentage of aid given
to sectarian schools is a relevant consideration, aid of a similar nature given to public
schools under different statutes ought to be considered in a determination of the breadth of
the class of beneficiaries in terms of "primary effect." Id. at 389 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
.3 Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 823 (White, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
O Lemon, 403 U.S. at 664 (White, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
, Id.; Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 823 (White, J., dissenting).
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fect requirement would not in the same instance possess a secular
purpose. The existence of this redundancy may explain why the
Court has given short shrift to the first part of the tripartite stan-
dard. The substantive issue is whether the secular effect of legisla-
tion is compelling enough to override any particular and indirect
benefit to religion.2 42 However, inclusion of the tautology in the
Lemon standard forces courts applying the standard to be preoccu-
pied with whether purpose and effect exist while neglecting to con-
duct the more crucial inquiry about how compelling the secular
function of the legislation might be. Concern for satisfying the
standard then obscures the substantive issue.
The addition of the third prong to the standard seemed to
originate not from the customary inquiry but from an extraneous
motive.243 Justice White has pointed out that the three-pronged
test "creates an insoluble paradox for the [s]tate and the parochial
schools. ' 244 He has criticized the Court for telling the state on the
one hand that it "cannot finance secular education if it permits
religion to be taught in the same classroom," while on the other
hand that "if it exacts a promise [from the school] that religion not
be so taught ... and enforces it," then the state is excessively en-
tangled with religion.245 In other words, while adequate state su-
pervision is deemed necessary to preserve the secular character of
public aid, that same supervision may often amount to excessive
entanglement.246 Thus, the appendage of the third requirement has
242 See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 664 (White, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
"I Cf. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 821 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting School Dist. of Abing-
ton Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963)) (noting that until 1970, "the test for
compliance with the [Establishment] Clause was whether there was 'a secular legislative
purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion' "). The third prong
first appeared in Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970) ("We must.., be sure that
the end result-the effect-is not an excessive government entanglement with religion.").
244 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 668 (White, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); see also
Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 822 (White, J., dissenting) (arguing that striking down of statute was
"insoluble dilemma for the [s]tates").
24 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 668 (White, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
24 Cf. Paul G. Kauper, Public Aid for Parochial Schools and Church Colleges: The
Lemon, DiCenso and Tilton Cases, 13 ARIz. L. REV. 567, 593 (1971) ("[It is perhaps ironic
that to avoid entanglements the Court has proposed criteria which will require a... [gov-
ernment] agency to become embroiled in the issue of sectarianism."). Moreover, the Court's
determination of bow much entanglement is "excessive" has been less than consistent. In
Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977), the Court held that the provision of diagnostic
services on parochial school premises and remedial services in mobile units parked outside
the parochial school did not create excessive entanglement. Id. at 248. However, in Aguilar
v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985), the Court found a state's monitoring of its own employees
who entered the parochial schools to provide remedial services to be excessive entanglement.
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augmented the predominance of the existing strict-separationist
position invalidating a statute despite its compelling secular pur-
pose and effect.
To supplant the Lemon standard, Justice White would elimi-
nate the tautology and jettison the paradox. He has said that legis-
lation ought to pass constitutional muster as long as it finances "a
separable secular function of overriding importance." '247 The pro-
posed standard of review is consistent with Justice White's under-
standing that public policy concerns rather than legal formalism
must be the focus of the parochial school aid cases.
4. The Permeation Argument
In Lemon the Court profiled the Rhode Island parochial
schools, most of which were Catholic, as permeated by a religious
atmosphere primarily because of the presence of members of reli-
gious orders who served as administrators and teachers. 48 Writing
for the court, Chief Justice Burger, stated that "a dedicated reli-
gious person, teaching in a school affiliated with his or her faith
and operated to inculcate its tenets, will inevitably experience
Id. at 413-14.
247 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 664 (White, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); see also
Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 768 (1976) (White, J., concurring) (upholding
Maryland statute authorizing payments to private schools for non-sectarian purposes); Hunt
v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 746 (1973) (upholding act authorizing financing transaction bene-
fitting Baptist-controlled college).
See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 615-16. This profile was based on the extensive factual find-
ings made by the Rhode Island district court. Id. at 615. Proximity of the schools to
churches allowed "instruction in faith and morals" that was "part of the total educational
process." Id. Religious symbols could be found throughout the school building. Id. Perhaps
most important, two-thirds of the teachers were religious sisters who created "an atmo-
sphere in which religious instruction and religious vocations are natural and proper parts of
life in such schools." Id. Several years prior to the Lemon decision, Giannella had remarked:
Understandably, there is a lingering suspicion that religious perspectives permeate
the entire curriculum at such schools. Even though this suspicion is probably un-
founded with regard to certain subjects, a strongly religious atmosphere, replete
with holy symbols, pervades the entire school day. Above all, as a recent study of
Catholic parochial education points out: "The very presence of the religious
[teachers and administrators] is in itself a dominant, unforgettable symbol." This
pervasive atmosphere makes on the young student's mind a lasting imprint that
the holy and transcendental should be central facets of life. It increases respect for
the church ....
In short, the parochial school's total operations serve to fulfill both secular
and religious functions concurrently, and the two cannot be completely separated.
Giannella, supra note 53, at 573-74 (citations omitted). For a discussion of the profile and
its implications, see LEONARD F. MANNING, THE LAW OF CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS IN A NUT-
SHELL 76-84 (1981).
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great difficulty in remaining religiously neutral. 2 49 Moreover, the
proximity of many schools to churches and the inclusion of reli-
gious symbols throughout the school building were suspected of
enhancing the propensity of the religious teachers to catechize the
impressionable elementary school children. In the majority's view,
there was no need to find actual religious permeation of secular
instruction; instead, a "potential for impermissible fostering of re-
ligion" was sufficient to declare the program violative of the Con-
stitution.250 The Lemon Court transposed its profile of the Rhode
Island parochial schools onto the Pennsylvania program also at is-
sue in that case.2 51 This profile also influenced several subsequent
parochial school decisions.252
The permeation argument relies on a truth in order to impart
a caricature. The truth is that parochial schools are designed to
serve a religious purpose. Until the start of the twentieth century,
almost all American schools, both public and private, had a strong
religious component that included daily prayer and religious in-
struction, often under the supervision of ordained Protestant min-
isters.253 Given the theological anthropology that prompted the
adoption of the religion clauses, it is untenable to hold that the
framers intended the First Amendment to render all public educa-
tion secular. Contrary to the strict-separationist assumptions of
the majority in Lemon, the postulate that public aid to religious
schools violates the First Amendment cannot be sustained on the
authority of original intent. 54
The religious mission of the parochial schools creates undenia-
ble and concrete secular benefits. These schools function as subsid-
iary structures that are inherently more adept at fostering a sense
of responsibility, participation, and belonging than are state-run
249 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 618. In a separate concurring opinion, Justice Douglas expressed
the crux of the permeation argument against parochial school aid when he wrote that "reli-
gion permeates the whole curriculum, and is not confined in a single half-hour period of the
day." Id. at 635 (Douglas, J., concurring) (quoting JOSEPH H. FICHTER, PAROCHIAL SCHOOL: A
SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY 86 (1958)).
250 Id. at 619.
21 Id. at 620-21. Speaking of the Pennsylvania schools, the majority opined that "[t]he
complaint describes an educational system that is very similar to the one existing in Rhode
Island." Id. at 620.
22 See MANNING, supra note 248, at 96-97 (discussing lingering effects of profile on
parochial school aid cases).
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institutions. Sociological evidence has connected the religious iden-
tity of the schools with the ability to create a sense of community
for students and families. It is this identity that has enabled paro-
chial schools to compensate for the erosion of the educational pro-
cess caused by the deterioration of the family. The benefit is par-
ticularly acute in the case of urban Catholic schools serving low-
income families many of whom are not Catholic; without the paro-
chial schools and their religious mission, students from these fami-
lies would not have equal educational opportunities. 55 In a less
tangible but equally significant way, the religious mission of the
schools develops the societal fabric by forming citizens who will
not be adverse to putting self-interests aside for the sake of the
common good. Rather than viewed as suspect, the religious mission
of these schools ought to be embraced as a healthy component of
the vigorous social pluralism envisioned by the founding fathers.
The profile of the parochial schools is caricature for several
reasons. First, if the permeation argument was ever valid, it is no
longer so. The atmosphere attributed to the presence of members
of religious communities in the schools might no longer be said to
be pervasive since their numbers have dramatically decreased dur-
ing the last twenty years. 5 Second, the suspicion raised in Lemon
that the content of secular classes cannot be separated from reli-
gious instruction was plainly contradicted by the record.257 Dis-
senting in Lemon, White described the majority's analysis as a
"curious and mystifying blend" that was grounded in the theoreti-
cal possibility of religious content being introduced into secular
courses rather than the factual findings made by the Rhode Island
Federal District Court.258 He argued "[tihat the schools are oper-
ated to promote a particular religion is quite consistent with the
view that secular teaching devoid of religious instruction can suc-
... See supra notes 66-77 and accompanying text.
"I' See CATHOLIC ALMANAC 1990, supra note 24, at 530. During the past twenty years,
the number of religious sisters, brothers, and priests who serve in parochial schools has de-
creased significantly. Today, in fact, the vast majority of parochial school teachers are
laypersons. See id.
257 See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 666 (White, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
..8 Id. Although the district court found that the Rhode Island parochial school teach-
ers did not introduce religious instruction into secular course, see DiCenso v. Robinson, 316
F. Supp. 112, 117 (D.R.I. 1970), the district court struck down the statute because the legis-
lation had the primary effect of supporting religious enterprises and resulted in excessive
entanglement. Id. at 122.
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cessfully be maintained. 2 59
The Court's rigidity in applying the Lemon standard has been
accompanied by a remarkable willingness to disregard the tradi-
tional function of an appellate court and to privilege its own specu-
lation over the plain record in these cases.26 0 The majority of the
Court in Lemon determined that the Rhode Island program of sal-
ary supplements to parochial school teachers violated the rule
against excessive entanglement because the theoretical possibility
existed that priests, religious, and lay teachers would interject reli-
gion into their secular courses even though the record contained
clear evidence to the contrary. 261 As the district court found, qual-
ity secular instruction is vital to the survival of the parochial
schools, 2 2 and the content of the secular courses taught there does
not substantially differ from that which is taught in the public
schools.2 3 One reason the parochial schools have been able to sur-
vive in the face of fully tax-supported public schools is that they
offer secular education at least equal in quality to that available in
the public schools. 6'
Justice White was also unable to reconcile the majority's sus-
picion of the potential for religious indoctrination by parochial
school teachers with the Court's decision in Tilton v. Richard-
son.26 r The Tilton case upheld the constitutionality o? direct Fed-
eral government grants to be used in the construction of buildings
for specified facilities at institutions of higher education, including
many that were founded and operated to serve a religious mis-
211 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 670 (White, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
60 See Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985).
If the district court's account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record
viewed in its entirety, the court of appeals may not reverse it even though con-
vinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the
evidence differently. Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the
factfinder's choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.
Id. at 573-74; cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a) ("Findings of fact. . . shall not be set aside unless
clearly erroneous, and due regafd shall be given the opportunity of the trial court to judge of
the credibility of the witnesses.").
I6 See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 667 (White, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). As
Justice White noted, "several teachers testified at trial that they did not inject religion into
their secular classes, and one teacher deposed that he taught exactly as he had while em-
ployed in a public school." Id.
26" DiCenso, 316 F. Supp. at 117-18.
20. Id. at 117.
261 See supra notes 69-77 and accompanying text.
265 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
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sion.266 By way of distinction, the Court has suggested that college
students at a religious institution are less likely to be swayed in
favor of a religious creed than parochial school children.267 Calling
such an explanation "make weight," Justice White thought it un-
convincing in light of the fact that the public aid in the parochial
school aid cases has always been limited to secular courses quite
apart from religious instruction. 6 s He further objected that there
was simply no "basis for finding college clerics more reliable in
keeping promises than their counterparts in elementary and sec-
ondary schools."26 9 Yet, the Court was content to rest its conflict-
ing decisions in Lemon and Tilton on such distinctions.
The propensity to privilege speculation over the record once
again won the day in Aguilar v. Felton,27 ° in which the Court
struck down New York City's use of federal funds to supply public
school teachers for certain types of remedial instruction to educa-
tionally disadvantaged students who attend parochial schools.2
The majority reasoned that the prophylactic contact necessary to
ensure that government-salaried remedial teachers who entered
the parochial schools were not conveying religious messages to
their students would constitute an excessive entanglement of
church and state.2 7 2 In a stinging dissent, Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor objected stating that, despite the fact that in the
nineteen-year history of the title I program "there ha[d] never
been a single incident in which [an] instructor 'subtly or overtly'
attempted to 'indoctrinate .. .students,'" the majority based its
conclusion of constitutionally impermissible entanglement on the
fear that such indoctrination was still possible.
When suspicion is contradicted by the record in the case, it
would seem only reasonable to put it aside in favor of fact. Al-
.66 Id. at 689.
267 See id. at 686 ("[Clollege students are less impressionable and less susceptible to
religious indoctrination.").
26. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 668 (White, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
269 Id.
270 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
271 Id. at 414.
2 2 Id. at 412-13. The majority held that the "monitoring" required "infringe[d] pre-
cisely those Establishment Clause values at the root of the prohibition of excessive entangle-
ment." Id. at 413.
273 Id. at 421, 424-25 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor added that "[iun light
of the ample record, an objective observer of the implementation of the ... program ...
would hardly view it as endorsing the tenets of the participating parochial schools." Id. at
425 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 66:261
JUSTICE WHITE'S DISSENTS
though public aid to parochial schools would undoubtedly provide
an incidental benefit to the religious mission of the schools, such a
secondary consequence ought not be the excuse to deny the press-
ing and weighty public policy reasons in favor of such aid.274
5. Summary
The Court's First Amendment jurisprudence is flawed in two
ways. First, the strict-separationist effort to justify the denial of
parochial school aid on the ground of the intent of the framers of
the First Amendment has yielded an oversimplified historical ac-
count. Second, it has produced a legal doctrine pursuant to which
the religion clauses are erroneously bifurcated. In both cases the
Court fails to appreciate the theological anthropology that inspired
the adoption of the religion clauses. Moreover, even when the
problematic historical foundation upon which the strict-separa-
tionist position rests is put aside, the introduction of the three-
pronged Lemon test has failed to produce a neutral set of legal
principles or a coherent corpus of case law. Justice White has
faulted the Court for neglecting the "overriding secular function"
of legislation in favor of a rigid adherence to Lemon's three prongs.
Speculation and caricature seemed to have supplanted the truth
about the parochial schools. Such an approach is not surprising
when one considers the strict-separationist prejudice embodied
within the standard. The approach seems difficult to justify, how-
ever, once the erroneous historical underpinning of the standard is
unveiled. Currently, a majority of the Court has joined Justice
White in expressing dissatisfaction with the three-part test.275 In
the matter of parochial school aid, it now seems probable that the
Lemon standard will be laid to rest.
276
274 See supra note 247 and accompanying text (discussing Justice White's separable
secular function of overriding importance test).
27l See, e.g., Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 656 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part) ("[s]ubstantial revision of our Establishment Clause doctrine may
be in order"); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636-40 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
("pessimistic evaluation ... of the totality in Lemon is particularly applicable to the 'pur-
pose' prong"); Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 430 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Choper, supra
note 222, at 681 ("anomalous results in our Establishment Clause cases are 'attributable to
[the] entanglement prong' "); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 110 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dis-
senting) ("three-part test represents a determined effort to craft a workable rule from a
historically faulty doctrine").
278 In Lee v. Weisman, 908 F.2d 1090 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. granted, 59 U.S.L.W. 3635
(U.S. Mar. 18, 1991) (No. 90-1014), a case presently under consideration by the Court,
presents an opportunity for it to reexamine the Lemon standard. The case involves an ob-
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III. THE VOUCHER CONCEPT
Any legislative attempt to recognize the significant contribu-
tions of the parochial schools to the social fabric is certain to be
tested in the federal courts pursuant to the First Amendment. Al-
though past decisions may reflect erroneous historical assumptions
and a formalistic doctrine, the Court's respect for stare decisis
may render it less willing to overrule case precedent, even in the
face of compelling reasons to do so.
An idea not yet tested before the Court is the voucher concept.
Typically, parents use vouchers as a substitute for tuition or other
admissions costs at any eligible and participating school.27 7 Under
a comprehensive voucher program, the term "public school" would
be redefined to include any school to which funds flow from public
sources-federal, state, or local. Alternatively, vouchers might be
available to all students in nonpublic schools or only to low-income
families.
Even under the narrow parameters of Lemon, a voucher pro-
gram with a primary secular effect would probably be constitution-
jection brought by a Jewish student at a Providence, Rhode Island Public High School to a
prayer offered by a rabbi at the school's graduation ceremony. Id. at 1090. The United
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed a decision of the Rhode Island district
court, which found that the prayer violated the effect prong of the Lemon standard. Weis-
man v. Lee, 60 U.S.L.W. 3635, 3352 (U.S. Mar. 18, 1991) (No. 90-1014). In its brief and
during oral argument, counsel for the Providence public schools urged the Court to scrap
the Lemon standard. Id. at 3352; see also Ralph D. Mawdsley & Charles J. Russo, High
Prayers at Graduation: Will the Supreme Court Pronounce the Benediction?, 69 W. EDUC.
L. REP. 189, 189-202 (1992); Henry J. Reske, Does Prayer Belong at Graduation?, 78 A.B.A.
J. 47-49 (1992).
277 See John E. Coons and Stephen D. Sugarman, Family Choice in Education: A
Model State System for Vouchers, 59 CAL. L. REV. 321, 324 (1971). Under the Coons and
Sugarman voucher plan, the percentage of a family's income devoted to education would
increase according to (1) the tuition of cost of the school to which a family sends a child,
and (2) the family's income. Thus, the program allows for a progressive reallocation of re-
sources according to income. For example, a family with $15,000 annual income might be
charged 1% of its total income to send a child to School A which spends $1,000 per pupil.
The same family might be charged 1.5% of its income to send a child to School B which
spends $2,000 per pupil. Now its own contribution would amount to $225 and the voucher
would be for $1,775. Another family with an annual income of $50,000 would spend $500
and receive a voucher for $500 to send a child to School A. They would spend $750 and
receive a voucher for $1,250 to send a child to School B. The authors would adjust the
general taxes collected for education to ensure that parents who choose to send their chil-
dren to the lowest costing schools would end up in a zero sum gain compared to the cost of
public education which parents do not pay for other than through their taxes. The authors
argue that such a program would increase parental decision making power with the field of
schools reflecting a wide range of ideological and curricular responses. See id. at 336-400.
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ally acceptable. 7 8 As Justice White observed, because the Court is
prone to concede the secular purpose criterium and becabse "the
validity of tuition grants or tax credits involving or requiring no
relationships whatsoever between the [s]tate and . . . any church
school" does not raise any entanglement issue, the primary effect
of such a program is the real constitutional concern .27 9 The Court's
decision in Mueller v. Allen280 tends to confirm Justice White's ob-
servation. Mueller upheld a Minnesota plan that allowed taxpayers
to claim a tax deduction for the expense of tuition, textbooks, and
transportation incurred in educating their children. 281 Three fac-
tors convinced the Court that the provision had a primarily secular
effect. First, the scheme was only one of many deductions, such as
those for medical expenses and charitable deductions, recognized
under the Minnesota tax laws; thus, it was part of a broad attempt
to distribute the tax burden equitably among all taxpayers.28 2 Sec-
ond, the deduction was available tb all parents, including those
with children in public and private schools. 2s3 The Court expressly
distinguished this case from Nyquist on these grounds.284 Third,
the aid was given to parents, not directly to sectarian schools. 285
2"8 See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-9, at 846 n.33 (1978).
Although Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973) .... would seem to forbid
using such publicly subsidized vouchers at racially discriminatory private schools,
the cases from Everson through Wolman indicate that ... the [E]stablishment
[C]lause should not pose an insuperable barrier to using such vouchers at paro-
chial schools. Indeed, to exclude only church-related schools from such a voucher
system might pose substantial free exercise problems.
Id.
278 Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 822 (1973)
(White, J., dissenting).
280 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
'8' Id. at 403.
282 Id. at 396.
283 Id. at 397.
211 See id. at 398. The breadth of the class of beneficiaries is an important factor in
sustaining forms of parochial school aid. See Mansfield, supra note 139, at 878 (suggesting
that breadth of class benefitted may determine whether aid violates Establishment Clause,
is required by Free Exercise Clause, or is matter of state discretion). For this reason, a
voucher program that includes all school children-those in public as well as those in pri-
vate schools-would almost certainly seem to present a broad enough class of beneficiaries
to pass the primary effect test.
285 Mueller, 463 U.S. at 399. This distinction increases the likelihood that a voucher
initiative would survive constitutional attack. For example, it was important to the Court in
Mueller that "public funds bec[a]me available only as a result of numerous private choices
of individual parents of school age children." Id. at 399. The Court also noted that with the
exception of Nyquist, all of the recent cases invalidating state aid to sectarian schools have
"involved the direct transmission of assistance from the [s]tate to the schools themselves."
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The distinction between direct aid to sectarian schools and aid
to individuals also played an important role in Witters v. Wash-
ington Dep't of Serv. for the Blind.286 In Witters, the Court ruled
in favor of a blind petitioner who sought state vocational rehabili-
tation funds in order to attend a seminary.2 87 As the majority opin-
ion stated, "[a]id recipients' choices are made among a huge vari-
ety of possible careers . . . the fact that aid goes to individuals
means that the decision to support religious education is made by
the individual, not by the [s]tate. '288 Since it is permissible for an
individual to use state funds to finance a seminary education, com-
mon sense beckons approbation of a parent's choice to use a
voucher at a parochial school with its beneficial consequences for
the common good. Given the theoretical and practical problems
with the Lemon standard, it would be preferable for the Court to
reach a judgment about a legislative program of vouchers in light
of White's proposed standard of review. The form of aid repre-
sented by vouchers appears to possess both the ability to satisfy
the stringent requirements of Lemon and to fulfill the demands of
public policy.
As manifested by the doomed fate of a recent New York Re-
gents voucher proposal, the educational lobby has vehemently op-
posed the voucher concept, characterizing it as the "embodiment
of everything that is threatening public education. '"28 9 Apart from
Id.
286 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
187 Id. at 489.
288 Id. at 488.
288 CHUBB & MOE, supra note 33, at 217. On July 26, 1991, the New York State Board
of Regents considered a proposal that provided for state-financed tuition vouchers to be
used by parents who elected to send their children to private or parochial schools. See Sam
Howe Verhavek, Regents Reject Voucher Plan for Tuition: Vote on Pilot Program Is Sur-
prisingly Close, 'N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 1991, at 25. Pursuant to the proposal, any student
attending one of the 59 public schools included on the Board of Regents list of "the worst
performing schools" in the state would be eligible for the voucher. Id. Most of the 59 are
located in urban areas with high concentrations of poor families. Id. Proponents argued that
poor children, whom the state system of public education fails to provide with basic educa-
tional skills, would not be likely to break the cycle of poverty. Id. The program was in-
tended as an experiment to test the possibility that parental choice in education would
stimulate healthy competition by providing an incentive for both public and nonpublic
schools to provide quality education. Id. Not surprisingly, "a broad coalition of educators
and administrators expressed visceral opposition to the concept." Id. at 26. New York State
Governor Mario M. Cuomo and New York City Schools Chancellor Joseph A. Fernandez
added their voices to that of the politically powerful coalition. Id. In the face of such opposi-
tion, the Regents rejected the pilot program in a "surprisingly close vote" of eight against
six. Id. Prior to the controversial vote, one of the six, Regents Vice Chancellor R. Carlos
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the transparent self-interest at stake, their objection confuses the
American ideal of public education with the present nationwide
"one best system" of public education. 9 The reality that the cur-
rent arrangement of American public education is not providing
equal educational opportunity to all students demands that some
degree of choice be instituted.91 Vouchers would insure alterna-
tives in education by enabling church-affiliated and other local
community groups to finance the schools of their choice. A voucher
program encourages increased parental involvement in education
by empowering parents to choose the best available education for
their children. 2
Because many and various groups would be free to run their
own schools, it might be objected that such a program could be
manipulated to maintain racial segregation in education. 93 Only
those schools, however, that meet standard state educational re-
quirements and comply with federal and state laws against racial
discrimination would be eligible to participate in the voucher pro-
gram. 4 Moreover, the intended beneficiaries of public educa-
Carballada, admonished his colleagues by referring to the 59 schools saying, "I know that
none of you would allow your children to attend any of those schools." Id. After the vote,
the Vice Chancellor indicated that the matter was not settled. Id. at 26.
29I See generally CHUBB & MOE, supra note 33, at 3-6 (discussing American public edu-
cation system as "one best system").
291 See generally Thomas G. Tancredo, The Case for Vouchers, 71 W. EDuc. L. REP.
593, 597 (1992) (arguing that without choice no real improvement will occur in American
education); Julie K. Underwood, Choice in Education: The Wisconsin Experience, 68 W.
EDuc. L. REP. 229 (1991) (discussing funding of private schools through public funds and
need for choice). But see Julie K. Underwood, Choices Is Not a Panacea, 71 W. EDuc. L.
REP. 599, 608 (1992) (suggesting that choice through vouchers may result in racially segre-
gated schools).
292 Cf. Ronald D. Rotunda, The Constitutional Future of the Bill of Rights: A Closer
Look at Commercial Speech and State Aid to Religiously Affiliated Schools, 65 N.C. L.
REv. 917, 930 (1987) (arguing that voucher system would encourage parents who send chil-
dren to parochial schools to vote for school tax increases since they would see reasonable
portion of tax dollars returned in form of vouchers).
29I But see Robert L. Woodson, Race and Economic Opportunity, 42 VAND. L. REv.
1017, 1035 (1989) (voucher legislation could include provision rendering it legally impermis-
sible for school to accept only white children while receiving public aid through voucher
program); cf. CHUBB & MOE, supra note 33, at 218 (suggesting that racial integration and
religious issues could be addressed).
I" A further objection might be that the program could enable "unusual" religious
groups to operate their own schools. It should be remembered, however, that the free mar-
ket would determine what kinds and quality of schools prosper as parents used vouchers to
express their preferences. Moreover, the problem of defining religion would not exist be-
cause religious instruction would neither be a prerequisite nor an impediment to public aid.
More importantly, perhaps, to restrict a policy on such fear would be to disempower the
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tion-children from low-income families, especially racial, ethnic,
and religious minorities-have become the victims of an educa-
tional system that often fails to provide them with basic educa-
tional skills.295 The special success that parochial schools have had
with the same population of students suggests that healthy compe-
tition would cause ineffective public schools to improve rather than
monopolize public funds in a less than successful effort.296
CONCLUSION
Thus, this Article envisions a new order for public education
in this country. Pursuant to the new order, a free market under
appropriate government regulation rather than unchecked political
authority would determine the flow of public aid to various
schools. Such an order would enable parents to choose what kind
of school, secular or sectarian, presents the most desirable educa-
tional environment. The new arrangement would also provide in-
centives for quality education, as schools now run by the state gov-
ernment would have to compete on an even field with schools that
currently receive no public funds.
It has been almost twenty years since Justice White first ex-
pressed the view that the Supreme Court's invalidation of paro-
chial school aid "was not required by the First Amendment and is
contrary to the long range interests of the country."2 7 The histori-
cal evidence now suggests the need for a substantial revision of the
Court's approach to the meaning of the religion clauses. Not only
should the new approach adopt a less formalistic doctrine that al-
lows consideration of the secular merits of parochial schools, but it
needs also to appreciate the theological anthropology and free-ex-
ercise concerns that inspired the adoption of the religion clauses.
While a fresh approach is desirable on the basis of the revised
understanding of the First Amendment's meaning, more pressing
and urgent public policy considerations demand it. The concrete
majority of parents who seek a wholesome religious education for their children for the sake
of deterring some unusual expressions of religious belief.
• See supra notes 65-71 and accompanying text.
• See supra notes 70-77 and accompanying text; see also Woodson, supra note 293, at
1035 (arguing that educational vouchers would serve to correct government policy that de-
nies blacks and other minorities freedom of choice in selecting schools). Woodson's argu-
ment makes good sense in light of the fact that for many minority parents parochial schools
are the only viable alternative in education.
2. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 820 (1973)
(White, J., dissenting).
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social reality is that the parochial schools are serving as the sole
guarantors of several constitutional rights for a significant number
of low- and middle-income families. In the absence of the parochial
schools, the Fourteenth Amendment's promise of equal protection
and due process as well as the First Amendment's free exercise
guarantee run the risk of being reduced to mere rhetoric.
To the extent that it fails to consider both the true meaning of
the First Amendment and the long-range interests of the country,
the Supreme Court's constitutional theory amounts to a flight from
reality. Through the medium of dissent, Justice White has chal-
lenged the Court to abrogate the argument based on historical au-
thority and to entertain the compelling public policy justifications
in support of parochial school aid. He has left open the possibility
that parochial schools will not be added to the list of defunct sub-
sidiary institutions. One can only hope that he may soon be recog-
nized as a herald of good news.

